Police Prosecutions and Punitive Instincts by Levine, Kate
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 98 Issue 4 
2021 
Police Prosecutions and Punitive Instincts 
Kate Levine 
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Law and Race Commons, and the Law Enforcement and 
Corrections Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Kate Levine, Police Prosecutions and Punitive Instincts, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. 0997 (2021). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol98/iss4/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 















VOLUME 98 NUMBER 4 2021  
 




This Article makes two contributions to the fields of policing and 
criminal legal scholarship. First, it sounds a cautionary note about the use 
of individual prosecutions to remedy police brutality. It argues that the calls 
for ways to ease the path to more police prosecutions from legal scholars, 
reformers, and advocates who, at the same time, advocate for a dramatic 
reduction of the criminal legal system’s footprint, are deeply problematic. 
It shows that police prosecutions legitimize the criminal legal system while 
at the same time displaying the same racism and ineffectiveness that have 
been shown to pervade our prison-backed criminal machinery. 
The Article looks at three recent trials and convictions of police officers 
of color, Peter Liang, Mohammed Noor, and Nouman Raja, in order to 
underscore the argument that the criminal legal system’s race problems are 
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playing themselves out predictably against police officers. The Article 
argues that we should take the recent swell of prison abolitionist 
scholarship to heart when we look at police prosecutions and adds to that 
literature by exploring this controversial set of defendants that are 
considered a third rail, even among most abolitionists. 
Second, the Article argues that police prosecutions hamper large-scale 
changes to policing. By allowing law enforcement to claim that brutality is 
an aberration, solvable through use of the very system that encourages 
brutality in the first place, we re-inscribe the failures of policing and ignore 
the everyday systemic and destructive violence perpetrated by police on 
communities of color. In order to achieve racial justice and real police 
reform, we must reduce our reliance on the police, rather than looking to 
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In August 2020, a summer marked by the largest protests against police 
brutality the country has ever seen,2 Linda Sarsour, a prominent activist 
known for founding the Women’s March and supporting many progressive 
causes, including the Movement for Black Lives, took to Instagram to share 
a video. The still above is from this video. In it, Sarsour wears a sweatshirt 
with the words “PROGRESS NOT PRISONS” prominently displayed. In 
the same image, she posts one hashtag: #ArrestTheCops. It refers to the 
police officers who killed a young Black woman named Breonna Taylor 
during a “likely-illegal,” warrantless raid on the sleeping woman’s home.3 
Sarsour’s post powerfully displays the tension that this paper seeks to 
address. In the very same moment that Sarsour advocates against prisons, 
she also advocates for the arrest, and, one must assume, eventual 
imprisonment of individual police officers.  
In 2019, an academic center displayed the same tension between 
decarceration and punitiveness. Chicago police officer Jason Van Dyke was 
sentenced to eighty-one months (a little under seven years) in prison for the 
shooting death of Black teenager Laquan McDonald. The MacArthur Center 
for Justice, an organization that advocates for “the most vulnerable” 
 
1. Linda Sarsour (@lsarsour), INSTAGRAM (Aug. 21, 2020), https://www.instagram.com/p/CEI 
4CWWpUGA. 
2. Larry Buchanan, Quoctrung Bui & Jugal K. Patel, Black Lives Matter May Be the Largest 
Movement in U.S. History, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/03 
/us/george-floyd-protests-crowd-size.html [https://perma.cc/Q6PB-ZVC5]. 
3. Radley Balko, Opinion, The No-Knock Warrant for Breonna Taylor Was Illegal, WASH. 













defendants in the criminal legal system,4 wrote a letter on behalf of 
numerous civil rights organizations, including Black Lives Matter Chicago, 
and clinics at two prominent law schools. 5 The letter argues that the 
sentence was illegally light because the law demanded Van Dyke serve 
consecutive sentences: “[T]he minimum lawful sentence that could be 
imposed on Mr. Van Dyke would require him to serve a sentence of 
imprisonment [of at least 18 years].” The letter’s authors make clear that 
they do not believe “that mandatory consecutive sentences are, as a general 
matter, fair, just or good policy.” In fact, the signatories “abhor, as a general 
matter, the pain that extremely long terms of imprisonment inflict on the 
Black and Brown defendants who are the ones typically sentenced to 
draconian prison terms under this sentencing scheme—the result of the false 
premise that such sentences deter crime or make our neighborhoods safer.”6 
Despite this abhorrence, however, the authors conclude that “Jason Van 
Dyke must be required to serve the sentence that Illinois law demands.”7 
Laid bare in these examples from the worlds of activism, advocacy, and 
academia are two conflicting impulses that are driving scholarship, rhetoric, 
and policy-making among generally left-leaning criminal legal system 
critics. On the one hand is the recognition that our criminal legal system is 
out of control, racist, ineffective, and unworkable.8 On the other is a 
 
4. A note on terms. I use the term “criminal legal system” for two reasons. One, it is simply 
more descriptive than its better known, “criminal justice system,” the term justice implies a value 
judgment. And second, as should be clear from this Article, I do not believe that our criminal legal 
system doles out justice in any sense of that word that I understand. Abolitionist, Mariame Kaba, calls 
it the “criminal punishment system,” which may be even more apt. See, e.g., Mariame Kaba, So You’re 
Thinking About Becoming an Abolitionist (Oct. 30, 2020), https://level.medium.com/so-youre-thinking-
about-becoming -an-abolitionist-a436f8e31894 [https://perma.cc/52MA-6SBD]. 
5. Letter from Roderick & Solange MacArthur Justice Center, Nw. Pritzker Sch. of L., to Hon. 
Kwame Raoul, Att’y Gen., State of Ill., and Joseph McMahon (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.macarthurjus 
tice.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Letter-to-Raoul-McMahon-.pdf [https://perma.cc/WD25-S4TQ] 
[hereinafter MacArthur Letter]. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. (“If . . . Laquan McDonald were to have been convicted of multiple counts of armed 
violence against a Chicago Police officer, the court would have found no difficulty in imposing 
consecutive sentences that would have sent him to the penitentiary for decades. Such extreme sentences 
are not uncommon.”). According to the letter, the only reason Van Dyke was sentenced so “lightly” is 
“because the defendant is a White police officer.” Id. It argues that his status as an officer “should have 
been considered as an aggravating factor at sentencing” and that “[i]f the prosecution of Mr. Van Dyke 
stands for anything, it is that no person, whatever his status or his authority, is above the law. The final 
act in this nationally important case cannot be the imposition of an unlawfully lenient sentence upon this 
convicted defendant.” Id. 
8. See, e.g., Chaz Arnett, From Decarceration to E-Carceration, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 641, 646 
(2019) (“It has become virtually impossible, and almost treacherous, to discuss the American criminal 
justice system without referencing mass incarceration as a central theme and problem.”); Daniel 
Farbman, Resistance Lawyering, 107 CAL. L. REV. 1877, 1941 (2019) (arguing that we have a “broadly 
broken criminal justice system that creates and perpetuates deep racial inequalities”); Benjamin Levin, 
The Consensus Myth in Criminal Justice Reform, 117 MICH. L. REV. 259, 310 (2018) (“[Much recent 
 











renewed fervor for criminal legal solutions for the political left’s most high-
profile villains: police officers.9 The punitive impulses from progressives 
are also aimed at sexual offenders10 and privileged, cisgender, white, male 
bad actors,11 all of whom are seen as “above the law[].”12 To be sure, these 
categories of people create vast societal problems, and attention to these 
problems is necessary.13 But the reliance on the criminal legal system, by 
those who would otherwise see it radically reduced, is a troubling reminder 
 
scholarship] raises questions about all aspects of the criminal system and the political economy in which 
it is embedded. It sounds not in the language of small-bore solutions or narrow, pragmatic fixes, but in 
terms of sweeping systemic critique.”); Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. 
L. REV. 1055, 1074 (2015) (“The U.S. criminal system is widely recognized as overly broad and 
spectacularly harsh, even by the people who run it.”). 
9. See infra Part I. 
10. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 1870, 1877 (2019) 
(“[C]riminal law has [not] protected sexual privacy as clearly or as comprehensively as it should.”); 
Margo Kaplan, Rape Beyond Crime, 66 DUKE L.J. 1045, 1049 (2017) (“The unwarranted assumption 
that rape law should be primarily criminal law has thus far dominated legal scholarship.”); see also 
Deborah Tuerkheimer, Beyond #MeToo, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1146, 1151, 1159 (2019) (arguing that 
because the criminal legal system does not adequately hold sexual assaulters accountable, “victims” 
have had to turn to alternative, “informal” accountability mechanisms); Darryl K. Brown, Criminal 
Enforcement Redundancy: Oversight of Decisions Not to Prosecute, 103 MINN. L. REV. 843, 849 (2018) 
(lamenting the criminal legal system’s “underenforcement” of sexual assault); Shawn E. Fields, 
Debunking the Stranger-in-the-Bushes Myth: The Case for Sexual Assault Protection Orders, 2017 WIS. 
L. REV. 429, 443 (2017) (arguing that criminal legal system’s “underenforcement” is a problem of bias). 
11. See Matthew Goldstein & Steve Eder, Jeffrey Epstein’s Mystery Bank Came Alive After His 
Death, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/04/business/jeffrey-epstein-estate 
-bank.html [https://perma.cc/C9PS-HJRZ]; Dan Mangan & Jim Forkin, Bernie Madoff Asking Trump to 
Reduce His Prison Sentence for Massive Ponzi Scheme, CNBC (July 24, 2019, 12:10 PM), https://www. 
cnbc.com/2019/07/24/bernard-madoff-asks-trump-to-reduce-prison-sentence-for-ponzi-scheme.html [h 
ttps://perma.cc/7AQ5-J52 H]; Marisa Fernandez, All the Trump Associates Convicted or Sentenced in 
the Mueller Investigation, AXIOS (Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.axios.com/trump-associates-convicted-
mueller-investigations-206295a1-5abc-4573-be25-4da19d9adcc9.html [https://perma.cc/RKA4-LA 
XN]. 
12. See Kate Levine, Police Suspects, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1199 (2016) [hereinafter 
Levine, Police Suspects]; see also Benjamin Levin, Mens Rea Reform and Its Discontents, 109 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 491, 526 (2019) (“[M]ens rea reform opponents from the (broadly conceived) 
political left appear to base their objections on a claim that the strict liability rules distribute better and 
that a move away from strict liability would simply represent a further upward redistribution of capital. 
Assuming there is some proper place for criminal law and criminal punishment, wealthy, privileged, or 
powerful defendants who harm the less powerful are deserving targets of prosecution and punishment.”); 
Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Criminal Affirmance: Going Beyond the Deterrence Paradigm to Examine the 
Social Meaning of Declining Prosecution of Elite Crime, 45 CONN. L. REV. 865, 910 (2013) (“When the 
richest and most powerful echelons of society enjoy affirmance of their crimes through non-prosecution, 
the rule of law erodes as all citizens face added temptation to skirt laws and regulations. After all, if the 
privileged are above the law, then the sway of the rule of law morally diminishes for all.”). 
13. See, e.g., Levine, Police Suspects, supra note 12 at 1206 (talking about social harms from 
police violence); Elizabeth C. Tippett, The Legal Implications of the MeToo Movement, 103 MINN. L. 
REV. 229, 234 (2018) (noting both that the MeToo movement started as a support network for the many 
people who had been sexually assaulted and how “[t]he MeToo movement also revealed the ways in 












of our societal addiction to criminal legal solutions and of how difficult it 
will be to dismantle this deeply unjust system.14 
This Article argues that a project to increase the harshness of the criminal 
legal system against police officers will, far from its proponents’ goals, 
legitimize and increase the footprint of our current criminal legal system. 
Such prosecutions may also lead to the continuation of the very policies and 
financial incentives that lead to police violence in the first place.15 The piece 
catalogues and describes the punitive procedural and substantive legal turns 
that scholars, civil rights groups, public defenders, and legislators have 
proposed or advocated to make it easier to prosecute the police.16 It argues 
that taken together, the legal proposals and rhetoric surrounding police 
prosecutions are familiar tactics that have been previously deployed in 
earlier eras by those in favor of “tough on crime” strategies to increase the 
number of people prosecuted for crimes, and the harshness with which they 
are punished.17 They are failed policies, not productive solutions. 
Reforms designed to prosecute and imprison more police may achieve 
desired outcomes for those who see the criminal legal system as functional 
with flaws. From this perspective, police prosecutions should probably 
occur more often because the perceived bias of the criminal legal system in 
favor of the police undermines the legitimacy of criminal law.18 Dismay at 
the number of officers who are not held criminally accountable for violent 
acts is justifiable.19 And these believers understand there to be legally and 
theoretically valid reasons for pursuing police prosecutions. Some believe 
that it will deter future bad acts by police;20 others believe that criminal 
punishment is morally just and necessary retribution for violent acts.21 
 
14. MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF 
AMERICAN POLITICS 77 (2015) (“The carceral state is highly resilient and adaptable . . . . [A] costly 
prison boom . . . occurred amidst a sharply anti-government, anti-tax turn in American politics.”). 
15. Barbara E. Armacost, Police Shootings: Is Accountability the Enemy of Prevention?, 80 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 907, 910 (2019) (arguing that individual blame solutions are illusory for true police reform). 
16. See infra Part I. 
17. See generally GOTTSCHALK, supra note 14; NAOMI MURAKAWA, THE FIRST CIVIL RIGHT: 
HOW LIBERALS BUILT PRISON AMERICA (2014). 
18. See, e.g., Alvin Bragg, Opinion, How to Hold Cops Legally Accountable for Killings, CITY 
& ST. (May 15, 2019), https://www.cityandstateny.com/articles/opinion/opinion/how-hold-cops-legally 
-accountable-for-killings.html [https://perma.cc/BCL5-SXBK] (New York special prosecutor 
suggesting that local district attorneys should be removed and the substantive law should be changed to 
make it easier to convict police officers). 
19. Id. (“For families who lose a son or a daughter, accountability for police conduct remains 
elusive. Criminal charges are rarely brought against the police officers involved . . . . Of the thousands 
of police shootings between 2005 and 2015, only 54 officers were charged. Very few cases end with a 
conviction.”). 
20. Rebecca Roiphe, The Duty to Charge in Police Use of Excessive Force Cases, 65 CLEV. ST. 
L. REV. 503, 517 (2017). (“[P]rosecut[ions] in police use-of-force cases [are] seen as animated by a 
desire to deter criminal acts . . . .”). 
21. Id. at 516 (“[V]ictims and activists seek retribution . . . .”). 











Perhaps most saliently, many see it as a form of racial justice for over-
policed, over-incarcerated communities of color.22 For those who are 
comfortable with the outlines of the criminal legal system, it is not hard to 
see why police prosecutions are a logical and necessary part of a system that 
may not be humming along as ideally as it should but is doing the work it 
was set out to do. Through this lens, successful prosecutions may represent 
the system correcting itself by holding bad actors accountable, pursuing 
racial justice, and punishing those who abuse their position.23 
But these are not the only advocates of police prosecutions. Indeed, it is 
hard to find anyone, other than police advocates, and a few of the most 
dedicated prison abolitionists,24 vocally opposing the prosecution of 
police.25 Moreover, many of the loudest pro-prosecution voices are those 
who, in other contexts, almost uniformly critique the harshness of the 
 
22. Bragg, supra note 18 (“[Changes to make prosecutions more likely] would . . . help restore 
at least some semblance of faith in the system, which for too many communities, has all but 
disappeared.”). 
23. See, e.g., Bill Hutchinson, Former Florida Officer Nouman Raja Sentenced to 25 Years for 
Killing Corey Jones, ABC NEWS (APR. 25, 2019, 4:38 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/florida-officer-
nouman-raja-sentenced-25-years-killing/story?id=62626285 [https://perma.cc/Y5V4-Z5NG] (“Today 
we can tell many of those families that there is hope. There is hope for America because a jury in Palm 
Beach, Florida, looked at all the evidence and they said a black man killed by the police can get equal 
justice, can get fair administration of the law.”) (quoting Jones’ family attorney, Benjamin Crump). Cf. 
Jasmine B. Gonzales Rose, Racial Character Evidence in Police Killing Cases, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 369, 
369 (2018) (“The United States is facing a twofold crisis: police killings of people of color and 
unaccountability for these killings in the criminal justice system.”); Nancy C. Marcus, From Edward to 
Eric Garner and Beyond: The Importance of Constitutional Limitations on Lethal Use of Force in Police 
Reform, 12 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 53, 71–72, 76 (2016) (“[W]hile the ten 2014–15 police 
killings highlighted in this article might seem to indicate a trajectory toward greater police 
accountability, as a general matter, most police killings still do not result in indictments of police.”). 
24. See, e.g., Andrea J. Ritchie, Ending the War on Black Women: Building a World Where 
Breonna Taylor Could Live, LEVEL (Oct. 27, 2020), https://level.medium.com/building-a-world-where 
-breonna-taylor-could-live-279746b1c55c [https://perma.cc/684Q-BNEM] ([C]alls for [police] 
prosecutions legitimize the criminal punishment system by promoting the idea that it can do justice in 
individual cases—against cops, a premise that directly undermines our wholesale challenges to its 
legitimacy on the grounds that it systematically defines justice as killing, maiming, raping, caging, and 
deporting Black people.”); Mariame Kaba & Andrea J. Ritchie, Opinion, We Want More Justice for 
Breonna Taylor than the System that Killed Her Can Deliver, ESSENCE (July 16, 2020), https://www.essen 
ce.com/feature/breonna-taylor-justice-abolition/ [https://perma.cc/7E5T-9BYM] (arguing against calls 
for police prosecutions) (“Turning away from systems of policing and punishment doesn’t mean turning 
away from accountability. It just means we stop setting the value of a life by how much time another 
person does in a cage for violating or taking it . . . .”); see also Allegra M. McLeod, Envisioning Abolition 
Democracy, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1613, 1638–40 (2019) [hereinafter McLeod, Abolition Democracy]. 
25. But see Armacost, supra note 15, at 910 (arguing that the problem of police shootings is 
institutional not individual and so must be solved institutionally); McLeod, Abolition Democracy, supra 
note 24, at 1638–40 (arguing that prosecuting police does not redress the problem of police killing, solve 












system—public defenders,26 reformist legal scholars,27 activists,28 and civil 
rights groups.29 In reaction to officers not being charged, or not being 
convicted, many have turned to the techniques and tools that have been 
central to propping up mass incarceration: dehumanizing police 
defendants,30 suggesting new and harsher substantive criminal laws,31 
eschewing procedural rights that contribute to fewer convictions,32 
lamenting too short sentences for those officers who are convicted,33 
 
26. See, e.g., Cynthia Conti-Cook, Statement on Start of Administrative Trial Against NYPD 
Officer Daniel Pantaleo, LEGAL AID SOC’Y (May 13, 2019), https://rachel-asher-7wk8.squarespace.com 
/news/2019/5/13/statement-on-start-of-administrative-trial-against-nypd-officer-daniel-pantaleo [https: 
//perma.cc/F9AA-2JUU] (“The Legal Aid Society has fought for more transparency around the NYPD 
and the Staten Island District Attorney’s failure to hold Pantaleo accountable despite City Hall’s 
continued political protection of both.”). 
27. See infra Part I. 
28. See, e.g., Kimberley Richards, Activist on Jason Van Dyke Sentence in Laquan McDonald 
Murder: ‘Slap in the Face,’ HUFFPOST (Jan. 19, 2019, 2:57 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/laqua 
n-mcdonald-jason-van-dyke-sentencing-activist_n_5c435057e4b0a8dbe171dd71?guccounter=1 [https: 
//perma.cc/5MW6-9JSA] (“William Calloway, a Chicago community organizer, told reporters on Friday 
that he and fellow community members were ‘devastated’ after learning about Van Dyke’s 
sentencing.”). 
29. See NAACP Calls for Justice in Stephon Clark Case, NAACP (Mar. 5, 2019), https://www.na 
acp.org/latest/naacp-calls-justice-stephon-clark-case [https://perma.cc/FZ42-8R2D] (“The nation’s 
foremost civil rights organization joins its NAACP Sacramento Branch in condemning Sacramento 
District Attorney Marie Schubert’s decision to not charge Sacramento Police officers Terrence Mercadel 
and Jared Robinet with murder for the killing of 22 year old Stephon Clark—an unarmed father and 
husband.”); ACLU, Advocates Urge Passage of State ‘Use of Force’ Bill, ACLU OF S. CAL. (Feb. 6, 
2019), https://www.aclusocal.org/en/press-releases/families-people-killed-police-support-ab-392-califo 
rnia-act-save-lives [https://perma.cc/H2K8-WEAX] (“‘AB392 sets a simple rule: that officers shouldn’t 
use deadly force unless it’s necessary to defend themselves or others,’ said Lizzie Buchen, legislative 
advocate with the ACLU of California. ‘Every day that goes by without meaningful reform is another 
day that a police officer may violently take another life, leading to mourning and outrage across our 
communities, particularly Black and Brown communities.’”). 
30. See infra Part III.A. 
31. Paul Savoy, Reopening Ferguson and Rethinking Civil Rights Prosecutions, 41 N.Y.U. REV. 
L. & SOC. CHANGE 277, 285 (2017) (proposing that Congress eliminate the “willfulness” requirement 
from federal criminal law that allows prosecutions of police for civil rights violations); Ben Adler, In 
California, Agreement on New Rules for When Police Can Use Deadly Force, NPR (May 24, 2019, 7:24 
AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/05/24/726500537/in-california-agreement-on-new-rules-for-when-pol 
ice-can-use-deadly-force [https://perma.cc/6W2P-3MBR] (change to substantive law to replace 
reasonableness requirement with a requirement that force be necessary for self-defense claim by police, 
noting that this change became the focus of civil rights groups after no charges were brought in the 
killing of Stephon Clark). 
32. Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Should the American Grand Jury Survive Ferguson?, 58 HOW. L.J. 
825, 826 (2015) (noting that “[a]s a result of widespread outrage in the wake of . . . high-profile cases, 
politicians, pundits, scholars, and lawyers alike have renewed calls for an end to the grand jury in the 
United States”). 
33. See, e.g., Jeffery Robinson, Judges Prove Laquan McDonald’s Life Didn’t Matter Very Much 
to the System, ACLU (Jan. 23, 2019, 5:15 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-law-reform/reformi 
ng-police/judges-prove-laquan-mcdonalds-life-didnt-matter-very-much?redirect=blog/criminal-law-ref 
orm/reforming-police-practices/judges-prove-laquan-mcdonalds-life-didnt-matter [https://perma.cc/ZZ 
9M-2KZM] (while acknowledging that “excessive sentences” are problematic, Robinson believes that 
“Van Dyke’s modest sentence for second-degree murder and the outright acquittals for Gaffney, Walsh, 
 











lambasting prosecutors who are seen to excuse criminal behavior,34 and 
insisting upon treating police as harshly as civilians are treated.35 In many 
cases these strategies are ones which have been clearly and persuasively 
shown to increase mass incarceration and to prop up the criminal legal 
system.36 
While these reactions are, on the surface, understandable, they do not 
cohere with a more sustained vision of seeing the criminal legal system 
radically altered or even eliminated.37 There is now renewed attention to and 
scholarship about prison abolition,38 which critiques prison reform 
advocates as thinking too small,39 and, in many instances, unintentionally 
worsening the most intractable problems with the criminal legal system.40 
Instead, prison abolition sees the criminal legal system as a bastion and 
perpetuator of white supremacy and social control over the poor.41 This 
Article enters this conversation by taking the police as its subject. A “prison 
abolitionist ethic”42 requires non-criminal solutions to our police brutality 
crisis. 
In order to re-envision the criminal legal system, we must seek 
alternatives, even when fairness or racial justice appears to demand a 
criminal legal recourse. This holds true even for those who have historically 
been privileged by criminal law and procedure. Scholars have done, and are 
currently doing, this sort of criticism in terms of carceral feminism—the 
 
and March sends a message to police—hang together and officers can walk away from almost anything 
without too much trouble, even if it’s on video”). 
34. See infra Part I. 
35. MacArthur Letter, supra note 4. 
36. See infra Part II (arguing that all reforms that add to the criminal legal system will lead to 
the further incarceration of poor people of color). 
37. GOTTSCHALK, supra note 14, at 276 (arguing that “national [civil rights organizations] will 
not lead the way out of the carceral state without pressure from a more radical flank”). 
38. See, e.g., Collection of Articles on Prison Abolition, HARV. L. REV., https://harvardlawrevie 
w.org/topics/prison-abolition [https://perma.cc/2BXM-7CF6].  
39. See generally ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? (2003). 
40. Allegra M. McLeod, Prison Abolition and Grounded Justice, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1156, 1161–
62 (2015) [hereinafter McLeod, Prison Abolition] (“When abolition is conceptualized . . . as a 
transformative goal of gradual decarceration and positive regulatory substitution wherein penal 
regulation is recognized as morally unsustainable—then inattention to abolition in criminal law 
scholarship and reformist discourses comes into focus as a more troubling absence.”). 
41. GOTTSCHALK, supra note 14, at 22 (incarceration aids the neoliberal project of ignoring root 
causes of poverty). 
42. McLeod, Prison Abolition, supra note 40, at 1161–62 (“By a ‘prison abolitionist ethic,’ I 
intend to invoke and build upon a moral orientation elaborated in an existing body of abolitionist writings 
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impulse to increase punitiveness for domestic43 and sexual violence,44 and, 
in a more limited way, for wealthy defendants who are seen to take 
advantage of the poor, or to use their privilege to maintain their class 
supremacy.45 But the police who commit violence against citizens remain, 
generally, a third rail.46 This is particularly so as the nation continues to 
grapple with violence by police, violence that has existed for centuries but 
has gained dramatic prominence since the killing of George Floyd and the 
murder charges brought against the four officers involved47 and the killing 
of Breonna Taylor and the outrage at the non-indictments in that case.48 
This Article concludes that police prosecutions do not align with either 
a prison abolitionist ethic or, less radically, a desire to see the criminal legal 
system treat people of color fairly.49 While there may be certain short-term 
gains from showing that the criminal legal system will punish its own actors 
 
43. See, e.g., Erin R. Collins, The Evidentiary Rules of Engagement in the War Against Domestic 
Violence, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 397, 402 (2015) (arguing that specialized evidence rules advocated for by 
feminists in domestic violence cases lead to draconian results for defendants and that “the manipulation 
of evidence rules works to the detriment of some complainants by overriding the explanations and 
experiences of those whose lived realities do not fit within the prevailing narrative of domestic violence 
or do not support the presumption that state-imposed separation is the only solution to domestic 
violence”); Leigh Goodmark, Reframing Domestic Violence Law and Policy: An Anti-Essentialist 
Proposal, 31 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 39, 51 (2009) (“[T]here is no strong evidence that criminalization 
deters men who batter from committing further acts of violence, even for the small percentage of men 
who are incarcerated for any appreciable period of time.”); Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 
IOWA L. REV. 741, 750 (2007) (“Unfortunately, feminist criminal law reform, which began laudably 
with the goal of vindicating the autonomy and rights of women, has increasingly mirrored the victims’ 
rights movement and its criminalization goals. Many of the widespread domestic violence reforms are 
more about increasing the likelihood of defendants going to jail than about supporting the individual 
desires, welfare, and interests of victims.”). 
44. See, e.g., Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and the War on Crime, 84 WASH. L. REV. 581, 583 
(2009) (critiquing the carceral turn taken by today’s feminists such that “many associate feminism more 
with efforts to expand the penal laws of rape and domestic violence than with calls for equal pay and 
abortion rights”). 
45. See Ben Levin, Rethinking Wage Theft Criminalization, ONLABOR (Apr. 13, 2018), https://o 
nlabor.org/rethinking-wage-theft-criminalization [https://perma.cc/79U5-MRVF] (arguing that 
progressives and workers’ rights activists might advance inequality and marginalization by attempting 
to criminalize financial abuses in the workplace). 
46. Cf. McLeod, Abolition Democracy, supra note 24 at 1639–40. (arguing against use and 
harshness of criminal legal system even for police who commit violent acts). 
47. See, e.g., Vera Bergengruen & Tessa Berenson, ‘It Was a Tinderbox.’ How George Floyd’s 
Killing Highlighted America’s Police Reform Failures, TIME (June 4, 2020, 1:22 PM), https://time.com/ 
5848368/george-floyd-police-reform-failures [https://perma.cc/VM97-8BCP] (“With nationwide 
protests extending into a second week, it’s clear that many Americans . . . . hope the tragedy of Floyd’s 
death may finally lead to long overdue reforms in Minneapolis and around the country— even in systems 
that so far have not been receptive to significant change.”). 
48. Shaila Dewan, Few Police Officers Who Cause Deaths Are Charged or Convicted, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/24/us/police-killings-prosecution-charges.ht 
ml [https://perma.cc/58QN-PRQG]. 
49. See McLeod, Abolition Democracy, supra note 24 at 1640 (noting that assumptions of justice 
from incarcerating police “tak[e] for granted that the application of criminal sanctions offers meaningful 
redress without inquiring more deeply into what interests are actually served by such an outcome and of 
what the promised justice substantially consists”); DAVIS, supra note 39. 











for racially biased violence, in the long-term, racial justice depends on the 
dramatic reduction of the criminal legal system. Indeed, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that, even in the short term, the system is playing out its racial 
pathologies in police prosecutions. The article explores the trials of Peter 
Liang,50 Nouman Raja,51 and Mohammed Noor.52 In these trials, officers of 
color were convicted in high profile cases, all three in jurisdictions where, 
up to that point, on-duty killings by white officers had not led to charges or 
convictions.53 
Moreover, a focus on criminal punishment for “bad apple” individual 
officers is a problematic obstacle to police reform.54 Allowing prosecutors 
and police departments to allege that individual shootings are the product of 
rogue or abnormal officers also allows them to claim that policing more 
generally is functioning well. It directs our attention away from the well-
documented systemic and organizational issues that lead to violence by the 
police.55 Moreover, it ignores the fact that most police violence is not just 
legal but accepted with little dissent. This ordinary violence is central to the 
subjugation of poor people of color and does tremendous aggregate harm to 
whole communities.56 
The Article has four Parts. Part I examines the many recent suggestions 
by scholars and advocates to ease the path to criminalization for police. 
There are myriad articles on how prosecutors can and should exercise 
harshness against the police, and ways to change criminal procedure and 
substance to yield more convictions of police officers. Part II looks at prison 
abolitionist literature and concludes that this literature compels us to take a 
much harder look at the problems with prosecuting our way to racial justice. 
Part III argues that using the criminal legal system against police who 
commit violence both legitimates and replays the racial pathologies of the 
criminal legal system. It looks at three recent trials and convictions of 
 
50. Sarah Maslin Nir, Officer Peter Liang Convicted in Fatal Shooting of Akai Gurley in 
Brooklyn, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/12/nyregion/officer-peter-lia 
ng-convicted-in-fatal-shooting-of-akai-gurley-in-brooklyn.html [https://perma.cc/BK2E-CETM]. 
51. Pilar Melendez, Nouman Raja, Former Florida Cop, Found Guilty for Murdering Corey 
Jones, DAILY BEAST (Mar. 7, 2019, 9:20 AM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/nouman-raja-former-flori 
da-cop-found-guilty-for-murdering-corey-jones [https://perma.cc/U4TZ-WF8P]. 
52. Joey Peters, Former Minnesota Policeman Convicted in Fatal Shooting of Australian 
Woman, REUTERS (Apr. 30, 2019, 3:33 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-minnesota-police/form 
er-minnesota-policeman-convicted-in-fatal-shooting-of-australian-woman-idUSKCN1S62SY [https://p 
erma.cc/C55L-63P5]. 
53. This is obviously not an empirical point. But I am pointing out that to the extent advocates 
of prosecuting the police believe that it will move us toward reaching racial equality in the criminal legal 
system, the successful prosecutions of officers of color may suggest that the racial pathologies of the 
system are simply replaying themselves in these prosecutions. 
54. See Infra Part III. 
55. See generally Armacost, supra note 15, at 910 (arguing that individual lawsuits are 













officers of color to illustrate these systemic issues. Finally, Part IV 
highlights why police prosecutions do not aid in reducing police brutality 
because police violence is systemic and legal. It concludes by pointing to 
another way to reduce all forms of police violence: reduced reliance on the 
police.57 
Police brutality is a crisis that is intimately bound up with our criminal 
legal system writ large. This Article shows that using that system to resolve 
the crisis of police violence is both futile and counter to the larger goals of 
decarceration and racial justice. 
I. “FIXING” THE PROBLEM OF POLICE PROSECUTIONS 
The perceived lack of charges, convictions, and long sentences for police 
officers is seen by many as a fundamental challenge to the fairness and 
legitimacy of the criminal legal system. Failures to secure charges and 
convictions have led reform advocates to question whether prosecutors are 
living up to their duty as the “guardians of public safety,” to their duty to do 
justice, and to their ability to carry out their mandate to charge fairly.58 
Similarly, the bias of juries and judges in favor of police and the substantive 
law itself have come under fire for leading to too much leniency in a system 
that is otherwise almost uniformly critiqued as too harsh.  
Scholars, legislatures, governors, civil rights advocates, and prosecutors 
themselves have responded by rushing to fill this confidence gap by 
proposing and implementing solutions for and promises to prosecute more 
police.59 Meanwhile, public defenders, activists, and civil rights groups who 
decry the criminal legal system’s footprint turn to it as a first and seemingly 
legitimate solution to bad acts by police officers.60 These calls for legislation 
and policymaking to make it easier to prosecute the police have grown 
exponentially in the wake of the killing of George Floyd. This is despite the 
fact that the officers in that case were arrested and have been charged with 
murder. The already-able Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison is 
 
57. See Amna A. Akbar, An Abolitionist Horizon for (Police) Reform, 108 CAL. L. REV. 1781 
(2020) [hereinafter Akbar, Abolitionist Horizon]. 
58. Rachel Barkow, Opinion, Prosecutors Need to Treat Police Shootings Like a Threat to Public 
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being aided in this prosecution, pro bono, by Neal Katyal, one of the most 
prominent private lawyers in the country.61 
This Part illustrates one area of the tension criminal justice reformers 
face when police commit violence against citizens. Scholars, advocates for 
reform, and self-styled “progressive prosecutors” speak at once about 
dramatic reduction of the criminal legal system’s footprint and, at the same 
time, invent strategies to increase prosecutions of police through 
prosecutorial discretion and procedural and substantive changes to our laws.  
A. Putting Pressure on Prosecutors to Charge More Police and to Charge 
Police with More Serious Crimes 
Prosecutors who do not bring charges or do not successfully indict police 
officers who harm civilians are critiqued on multiple fronts: their decisions 
to decline prosecution,62 the care and time they take to investigate officers,63 
and their seemingly defendant-friendly presentations to grand juries. 
Prosecutors are harshly criticized for the amount of care and consideration 
that they give to a case involving police before charging or bringing an 
officer before a grand jury.64 When civilians are arrested, or a crime is 
brought to the attention of a prosecutor, charges are usually brought 
immediately and any mercy to the defendant comes, if ever, after charges 
are filed.65 With police, prosecutors act much more deliberately, taking up 
to a year to make a charging decision, and investigating the allegations 
before they charge. Often the result in these cases is a prosecutorial 
declination to charge.66 This care and consideration is seen as evidence of 
bias, unfairness, and a rigged system. Most who focus on this disparity want 
to see the police treated with the same reflexivity as ordinary suspects.67 
Prosecutorial mercy toward police, I have argued,68 should be harnessed 
as a model for the way the criminal legal system should operate more 
generally. Yet again, most see prosecutorial mercy toward police as a 
 
61. Kevin Featherly, All-Star Lawyers Sign onto Floyd Murder Case, MINN. LAW. (Jul 15, 2020), 
https://minnlawyer.com/2020/07/15/all-star-lawyers-sign-onto-floyd-murder-case [https://perma.cc/SU 
7A-NHM9]. 
62. Kate Levine, Who Shouldn’t Prosecute the Police, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1447 (2016) 
[hereinafter Levine, Who Shouldn’t Prosecute] (arguing that prosecutors have a conflict of interest when 
they are tasked with charging officers on whom they rely). 
63. Kate Levine, How We Prosecute the Police, 104 GEO. L.J. 745, 764–65 (2016) [hereinafter 
Levine, How We Prosecute] (noting that prosecutors are criticized for the time and care put into decisions 
about whether to prosecute police). 
64. Id.  
65. Id. at 767. 
66. Id. at 764–65. 
67. Id. at 764–67. 












problem that must be solved by leveling down the treatment of police.69 
Thus, suggestions to change the way the system treats police abound, 
including who prosecutes the police,70 how prosecutors exercise their 
discretion when it comes to police suspects,71 and how much control outside 
authorities should have over prosecutors’ decisions regarding police.72 The 
theme of all of these suggestions is that prosecutors are not charging police 
suspects enough when they harm civilians while on duty.73 
Indeed, despite the orientation of this Article, I too have contributed to 
the writing on ways to take the bias out of prosecuting the police in a way 
that tends toward harshness. In an earlier article, I wrote at some length 
about the inherent conflict of interest local district attorneys face when 
prosecuting the police.74 While the article’s aim was to uncover the conflict 
rather than to suggest what level of charging was appropriate when police 
became suspects, the motivation behind the article was the nonindictments 
of Darren Wilson for the shooting death of Michael Brown and Daniel 
Pantaleo for the choking death of Eric Garner.75 The assumption underlying 
my recommendation to remove the charging decision from the hands of 
local prosecutors to an agency or entity less reliant on the local police force 
was that more prosecutions would be forthcoming if prosecutors did not 
have personal and professional conflicts on the line.76 Over the past several 
years, my thinking has changed considerably on this topic for the reasons 
set forth in latter Parts of this Article. 
Removing local district attorneys has been a popular political act since 
the specter of police violence has become a focus of the public and 
therefore, the legislative and executive branches of state government.77 
Recently, when the Hennepin County district attorney, who was perceived 
as not bringing serious enough charges against Derek Chauvin, the officer 
who choked George Floyd, and not bringing swift enough charges against 
 
69. See, e.g., Vida B. Johnson, KKK in the PD: White Supremacist Police and What to Do About 
It, 23 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 205, 238–39 (2019) (“With so few prosecutions of police even in the 
wake of high profile murders of unarmed civilians, it is not hard to see that most prosecutors have failed 
to act vigorously to rid police departments of troubled officers. Few efforts to rid departments of problem 
officers, even in this moment of heightened scrutiny, have been seen.”). 
70. Levine, Who Shouldn’t Prosecute, supra note 62. 
71. Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Rethinking Prosecutors’ Conflicts of Interest, 58 B.C. 
L. REV. 463, 468 (2017) (suggesting that an “internal deliberative model will allow prosecutors’ offices 
to learn from their mistakes and alter their approach in response [to police prosecutions]”). 
72. Compare id. (arguing that district attorneys’ offices should maintain control), with Levine, 
Who Shouldn’t Prosecute, supra note 62, and Part IV (suggesting a number of alternatives to local 
district attorneys). 
73. See Johnson, supra note 69. 
74. Levine, Who Shouldn’t Prosecute, supra note 62. 
75. Id. at 449. 
76. Id. at 1464–1477. 
77. See sources cited infra notes 78–83. 











the three officers who did not step in to stop him, the case was reassigned 
to Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison, who immediately charged all 
four with murder.78 More wide-rangingly, in New York, Governor Cuomo 
signed an executive order, to much fanfare, removing all police shooting 
cases to a specially-created office in the Attorney General’s office.79 Special 
prosecutors have been assigned in other states,80 and, in almost every police 
shooting case, there are now calls from advocates and community groups to 
remove the case from the hands of the local district attorney’s office.81 
Additionally, a new wave of “progressive prosecutors” has swept into 
offices throughout the country. Many of these new prosecutors ran on a 
promise to bring “accountability” to police by aggressively charging and 
prosecuting the “bad apples” who harm civilians or by promising special 
prosecutors in all police violence cases.82 For instance, Kim Foxx, the 
current Cook’s County State’s Attorney included the prosecution of Jason 
Van Dyke by an independent prosecutor as part of her successful campaign 
to oust the incumbent.83 Former public defender Wesley Bell, who 
successfully ousted Robert McCulloch in St. Louis, made independent 
prosecutions of police part of his platform too.84 Perhaps the most famous 
“progressive” prosecutor, Larry Krasner, filed charges against eight 
 
78. Alex Johnson, Minnesota Attorney General to Take Over Prosecutions in George Floyd’s 
Death, NBC NEWS (May 31, 2020, 5:40 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/minnesota-attor 
ney-general-take-over-prosecutions-george-floyd-s-death-n1220636 [https://perma.cc/XVG8-5SW4]. 
79. Noah Remnick, Cuomo to Appoint Special Prosecutor for Killings by Police, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 7, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/08/nyregion/cuomo-to-appoint-special-prosecutor-fo 
r-killings-by-police.html [https://perma.cc/L5PW-H22F]; Dan M. Clark, Cuomo Renews Push to Codify 
NY AG Role as Special Prosecutor in Police-Involved Deaths, N.Y. L.J. (June 3, 2019, 5:45 PM), 
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/06/03/cuomo-renews-push-to-codify-ny-ag-role-as-spe 
cial-prosecutor-in-police-involved-deaths [https://perma.cc/QZ6Y-PFQR]. 
80. Rachel Frazin, Judge Appoints Special Prosecutor in South Bend Police-Involved Shooting, 
THE HILL (July 3, 2019, 4:06 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/451611-judge-appoints-spe 
cial-prosecutor-in-south-bend-police-involved-shooting [https://perma.cc/C96Z-ZXZ7]. 
81. See, e.g., Megan Crepeau, Judge Declines to Appoint Special Prosecutor in Chicago Police 
Shooting, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-met-chicago-p 
olice-shooting-special-prosecutor-20171031-story.html (request for special prosecutor in killing of Flint 
Farmer by Officer Gildardo Sierra). 
82. Note, The Paradox of “Progressive Prosecution,” 132 HARV. L. REV. 748, 754–55 (2018) 
[hereinafter Paradox]; Rachael Rollins, Rachael Rollins: Don’t Ignore the Need for Progressive District 
Attorneys, REWIRE NEWS GROUP (Aug. 31, 2018, 3:56 PM), https://rewire.news/article/2018/08/31/rach 
ael-rollins-dont-ignore-the-need-for-progressive-district-attorneys [https://perma.cc/4RY5-UXT2]; 
James Queally, George Gascon to Challenge Jackie Lacey for L.A. County Top Prosecutor, in Pivotal 
D.A. Race, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2019, 3:44 PM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2019-10-28/ 
george-gascon-to-challenge-jackie-lacey-for-l-a-county-top-prosecutor-in-pivotal-d-a-race; Real 
Justice, Chesa Boudin Will Prosecute Officers Who Break the Law, FACEBOOK (Oct. 26, 2019), https://w 
ww.facebook.com/realjusticepac/videos/chesa-boudin-will-prosecute-officers-who-break-the-law/1443 
637169117138 [https://perma.cc/2B4V-VN2M]. 
83. Paradox, supra note 82. 
84. Astead W. Herndon, Can a Criminal Justice Advocate Unseat Ferguson’s Lead Prosecutor? 













Philadelphia police officers, including two for an illegal stop-and-frisk.85 
These increased prosecutions are seen as an equally important “reform” as 
his reduction in prosecution of civilians.86  
And there is evidence, indeed, that pressure from racial justice activists87 
and groups like the Movement for Black Lives,88 established legal reform 
groups,89 celebrities,90 and public sentiment more generally have led to more 
prosecutions of officers. As one author notes approvingly, “In 2015, 
eighteen police officers were charged in fatal on-duty shootings, more than 
three times the average yearly number over the preceding decade.”91 
Prosecutors who decide to charge police officers make very public 
announcements, as was the case with the unsuccessful prosecution of the 
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officers involved in the 2015 death of Freddie Gray in Baltimore.92 There, 
the prosecutor took to the steps of city hall to hold a press conference 
announcing charges against six officers. The criminal legal evidence against 
the officers was unclear from the start and none of the officers’ prosecutions 
ended in convictions.93 Yet, the decision to charge was met with much 
approbation from the public, including—perhaps especially—those who, in 
general, decry the state of mass incarceration, the conditions of 
incarceration, and the overcharging that leads to long sentences.94 
Anecdotally, this movement appears to be gaining even more steam now. 
Since the summer protests of 2020, charging police officers who kill or 
injure civilians, particularly civilians of color, seems to be ratcheting up.95 
The officers who killed George Floyd have been charged with murder, 
including three rookie officers through accomplice liability charges, 96 a 
type of felony murder charge that has been under attack from criminal law 
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reformers for decades as exceedingly harsh.97 In Georgia, an officer has also 
been charged with murder in the killing of Rayshard Brooks, despite the fact 
that Mr. Brooks had taken a taser from another officer.98 The murder charges 
against the three officers who did not step in to stop the killing of Mr. Floyd 
and the swift murder charge in the Brooks case, where a plausible self-
defense justification exists, suggests that prosecutors have begun to employ 
the charge first, think later posture usually reserved for civilian defendants 
for police officers too.99 From an equity stand point, this may be admirable; 
from a systemic change perspective, it is troubling.100 
These charges reflect a ramping up of the pressure that has already been 
exerted on prosecutors in the past few years. When prosecutors “fail” to 
bring justice through charging police officers, they are publicly lambasted, 
their ability is questioned,101 and their evidentiary decisions are scrutinized 
and undermined by media. For instance, following the shooting death of 
unarmed teenager Stephon Clark, the Sacramento District Attorney declined 
to charge the officers involved, saying, “[W]hen we look at the facts and the 
law, and we follow our ethical responsibilities, the answer to that question 
[whether they committed a crime] is no. And as a result, we will not charge 
these officers.”102 This decision set off waves of protests from the 
community, and second-guessing by the media and public.103 The media, 
even in facially straightforward reporting, has sought to undermine the 
decision in the case. The New York Times, in an article quoting the District 
Attorney’s reasoning for her decision, noted that it had performed its own 
analysis of the evidence in the case and had found, contrary to the District 
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clark-protests-sacramento-police-shooting [https://perma.cc/XJ8T-LT7J] (noting that the decision not to 
charge led to a number of protests). 











Attorney’s statement, that the police were unreasonable in their fear of Clark 
because “gunfire continued after Mr. Clark had fallen to his hands and 
knees.”104 Indeed, the article notes that, “Six of the seven shots most likely 
hit Mr. Clark as he was falling or was already on the ground . . . . Three 
minutes passed after the shooting before police officers identified 
themselves to Mr. Clark, and he did not receive medical attention for six 
minutes.”105 While the article did not explicitly say that the prosecutor was 
dishonest about the lack of probable cause to charge the case, the 
presumption was clear.106 
When the Staten Island District Attorney failed to get an indictment 
against officer Daniel Pantaleo, the local chapter of the NAACP brought 
suit to have the charges reinstated and a new grand jury impaneled. Their 
brief noted that such a result would “send [a] message” to prosecutors seen 
as not trying hard enough to indict officers like Pantaleo that “they, too, 
have to play by the rules that seek to ensure a measure of justice in the 
criminal justice system” and that if prosecutors did not more aggressively 
pursue charges against officers, they would be “subject to oversight by the 
bar.”107 
The perception that more charges against police officers will bring more 
accountability and “justice” for overpoliced communities is shared by 
numerous scholars. These scholars look to law and politics to increase the 
likelihood that police officers can be charged. Some have suggested that a 
prosecutor’s usual unfettered discretion be removed when it comes to 
declining to charge officers. One author has suggested that there is in fact a 
“duty to charge” police stating it is “an abuse of discretion not to charge the 
most culpable police officers, even when the evidence is imperfect or juries 
are unlikely to convict.”108 And another author has proposed a statute that 
requires the justice department to investigate every instance of lethal force 
by police.109 Others have suggested that declinations by prosecutors or 
failed indictments by grand juries be made completely “transparent” so that 
the these decisions can be scrutinized for error and bias “both by an 
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independent authority and the public.”110 Still others have argued that 
prosecutors abdicate their duty to the public if they do not lobby in favor of 
changing the substantive law to make it easier to convict police who claim 
to be in fear for their lives.111 
In short, there has been tremendous pressure placed on district attorneys 
to use their discretion to prosecute more police officers. This pressure is 
ratcheting up at a time when the general trend has been toward fewer 
prosecutions and more mercy toward criminal suspects. 
B. Changing Criminal Procedure to Prosecute More Police 
In addition to pressuring district attorneys to use their power to bring the 
criminal legal system to bear on the police, scholars have suggested ways to 
ease the path forward to prosecution and conviction by changing criminal 
procedure. This includes taking away police interrogation rights and 
changing the way grand juries operate. 
A number of scholars and advocates want to change the way police are 
investigated when suspected of unjustified on-duty harm. For example, 
several states currently have statutory laws known as the Law Enforcement 
Officers’ Bill of Rights (LEOBOR).112 Included in these statutes are certain 
rights that police officers have when they are being questioned by other 
officers.113 Such rights include: limitations on how long, and during what 
part of the day an officer can be questioned; notification about who will 
question the officer and limits on the number of interrogators; restrictions 
on the threats and inducements interrogators can use to get a confession; 
and a requirement that officers be able to sleep, eat, and use the restroom.114 
I have argued that these rights dovetail with what scholars have suggested 
for years should be applied to all suspects.115 Instead of leveraging this 
disparity to fight for better protection for civilians suspects, however, most 
who consider LEOBORs favor their abolishment because they fear that 
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these rights are an obstacle to the successful investigation and prosecution 
of police officers.116 
There have also been numerous suggestions about reforming or even 
abolishing the grand jury based on the nonindictments in the Darren Wilson 
and Daniel Pantaleo cases in particular.117 California passed a statute 
abolishing the grand jury in police cases, making all of them subject to a 
preliminary hearing in front of a judge, and in public.118 This statute was 
later determined to be unconstitutional.119 
Scholars have suggested various modifications to the grand jury, 
including removing the longstanding secrecy requirement120 and forcing the 
prosecutor to call the family members of the injured party.121 Another 
suggestion is to “institute enhanced court supervision” after the return of a 
nonindictment and, if a juror complains of racial bias, to consider 
empaneling a second grand jury.122 As Roger Fairfax details, the reaction to 
the nonindictments in Ferguson and Staten Island have led some to go so far 
as to suggest abolishing the grand jury for all defendants.123 While many 
have critiqued aspects of the grand jury in the past, these critiques have been 
based almost entirely on the fact that grand juries indict too often. The thrust 
of these reform proposals is that, in police cases, grand juries do not indict 
enough.124 
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Police violence then is fueling advocacy to ramp up the procedural 
machine that leads to more criminal charges and convictions. 
C. Changing Substantive Law to Prosecute More Police 
Some scholars and advocates identify the problem not as the prosecutor’s 
biased exercise of mercy or an excess of procedural rights but as a 
substantive law problem. Seeing the police “use of force” standard as too 
lenient, these commenters have made a number of suggestions to change 
both state and federal criminal law so as to smooth the way for prosecutors 
to charge, indict, and convict officers accused of on-duty crimes.125 
Since the killing of George Floyd, there have been numerous legislative 
moves to make it easier to prosecute police. Numerous state legislatures are 
also considering new laws to create new or more serious crimes for police, 
including making chokeholds a separate crime and creating a duty to 
intervene for officers who are witnesses to misconduct by their 
colleagues.126 These new bills and the excitement behind them underscore 
the larger point of this Article, that the desire to see police imprisoned is 
contributing to the continual ballooning of our bloated criminal legal codes, 
particularly given that the incident that motivated them has been charged 
under existing law. 
These new bills have successful precedent. After the killing of unarmed 
Stephon Clark, California changed its self-defense law for officers.127 The 
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new statute, dubbed “The California Act to Save Lives,” opens officers up 
to criminal liability unless their use of force is deemed “necessary” to 
defend their own or another person’s life.128 The change is small and seems 
logical. Some have maintained that the major change is to ensure that 
officers have used “de-escalation tactics” prior to using force.129 
Yet proponents of the bill, who know how small changes to language in 
criminal law can lead to many more charged cases with politically 
motivated prosecutors, championed the bill’s attendant increase in criminal 
liability as an important and momentous change. According to the ACLU, 
which vocally supported the bill, the change was “urgently needed because 
every day that goes by without addressing California’s epidemic of police 
violence is another day that a police officer may violently take another 
life.”130 In other words, in this instance, the ACLU believes we must make 
it easier to prosecute and convict officers in order to stem the tide of police 
violence and to save lives.  
Gavin Newsom—California’s criminal justice-reform oriented 
Governor131 who in 2019 put a moratorium on California’s death penalty, 
shutting down the country’s largest death row132—celebrated his signing the 
statute into law and noted his hope and belief that “[a]s California goes, so 
does the rest of the United States of America.”133 Some activists who had 
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supported the bill initially voiced their dismay with the statute’s final form 
as not criminalizing more activity. The Black Lives Matter Los Angeles 
Chapter leader, Melina Abdullah, told The Guardian newspaper 
“Unfortunately, in efforts to get law enforcement to lift their opposition, the 
bill was so significantly amended that it is no longer the kind of meaningful 
legislation we can support.”134 
Legal scholars have also lent support to the bill as a way to increase 
legitimacy for the police135 and as a way for prosecutors to ensure they 
remain “guardians of public safety.”136 Still other scholars believe states 
must change their laws because the constitutional reasonableness standard 
on which many states’ laws are based is “an after-the-fact justification for 
the use of deadly force allowing officers to kill first then justify next”137 
rather than a legitimate legal defense. This author points to the released 
grand jury transcripts in the Darren Wilson case, stating that Wilson’s 
narrative of the events “follow[s] Missouri’s deadly force standard chapter 
and verse inculcating the necessary fear for life facts and describing how 
Mr. Brown potentially endangered Wilson’s life or could inflict serious 
injury.”138 It bears noting that this is the strategy employed by any defense 
attorney whose client claims self-defense or justification in her case. To this 
end, and as this Article would predict, another author has already used these 
substantive changes to argue in favor of harsher standards for civilian 
defendants—expressing the hope that attention to the substantive standard 
for police self-defense will reinvigorate a discussion about a too lenient 
standard in “private violence.”139 
The perception of a new problem of victims of color dying at the hands 
of white officers has also motivated scholars to suggest significant changes 
to the federal law. Currently, in order to prosecute a state police officer 
under federal law, the officer must “willfully” violate a person’s civil 
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rights.140 This high standard is, in part, a recognition that the federal 
government does not prosecute people for offenses, such as homicide, long 
considered in the province of state prosecutors and courts.141 But scholars 
are now using perceived leniency against police officers to suggest 
removing the willfulness provision from federal law and encouraging more 
federal prosecutions, particularly in cases where state grand juries do not 
indict or state juries do not convict.142 One author suggests that, if this 
change is too long in coming legislatively, the executive branch could use 
its power “to revise the law” in the interim, citing President Obama’s 
decision to disallow torture as precedent for such a move.143 These 
suggestions have now gotten traction in Congress. A bill has been 
introduced to lower the intent standard to prosecute police for the violation 
of a person’s civil rights from willful to knowing or reckless.144 
Another scholar has suggested including “willful deprivation of rights 
under color of law” as an aggravating circumstance to the federal death 
penalty to ensure that police officers can be sentenced to death more easily 
in cases where they kill civilians.145 Remarkably, the author states that “[t]he 
relationship of capital punishment to civil rights is not only possible but 
fully in force today through the federal criminal law of civil rights 
enforcement. Moreover, there are compelling reasons for maintaining, or 
even strengthening, those connections.”146 Ensuring that more officers are 
sentenced to die might assure the public that “the death penalty is applied 
evenhandedly” and “inspire greater confidence that the death penalty can be 
consistent with the interests of groups that have historically been subjected 
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to both and state and private violence and that have not historically enjoyed 
political power.”147 
In short, in the past few years, scholars and advocates—most of whom 
desire to see a dramatic reduction in the footprint of the criminal legal 
system—have made numerous suggestions to increase the system’s 
efficiency and harshness regarding police officers. This suggests that, 
despite recent vocal calls for dramatic and radical change to the criminal 
legal system, many still see it as a necessary and effective way to combat 
systemic societal harm. In the next Parts, I will suggest that those who seek 
to radically reform the criminal legal system must view police prosecutions 
through the same lens they view ordinary prosecutions. 
II. VIEWING POLICE PROSECUTIONS WITH AN ABOLITIONIST ETHIC 
While scholars and advocates are attempting to ease the path to 
criminalization for police, most scholarship and advocacy is focused on 
dramatically reducing the criminal legal system.148 In fact, prison abolition, 
the idea that the criminal legal system should be radically reduced, if not 
torn down in its entirety, has gained tremendous traction in legal, academic, 
and advocacy circles in the past several years.149 The mainstream media too 
has begun to surface the voices of prison abolitionists.150 There is an 
inherent tension between advocating for large scale reduction in the criminal 
legal footprint, while at the same time ratcheting up the system’s harshness 
toward the police. This Part will introduce the central theme of this Article: 
that this inherent tension is an obstacle to dramatic decarceration. 
This Part will introduce the idea of an abolitionist ethic.151 It will engage 
with the work of Angela Y. Davis, Allegra McLeod, and others who have 
written about prison abolition generally152 and more tangentially as it 
applies to the police.153 And it will put forth the main contribution of this 
 
147. Id. at 1632. 
148. See sources cited supra note 8. 
149. See e.g., Akbar, Abolitionist Horizon, supra note 57; Collection of Articles on Prison 
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150. See, e.g., Rachel Kushner, Is Prison Necessary? Ruth Wilson Gilmore Might Change Your 
Mind, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/17/magazine/prison-abolit 
ion-ruth-wilson-gilmore.html [https://perma.cc/2WVT-ZBE8]; Why Is This Happening? with Chris 
Hayes, MSNBC (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.stitcher.com/podcast/msnbc/why-is-this-happening/e/5992 
7721 [https://perma.cc/PG5T-Z7E3] (interview with prison abolitionist, Mariame Kaba); Ephrat Livni, 
Meet the Former Federal Prosecutor Who Wants to Abolish Prisons, QUARTZ (Feb. 15, 2019), https://qz. 
com/1549163/meet-the-ex-federal-prosecutor-who-wants-to-abolish-prisons (interview with Professor 
Paul Butler). 
151. McLeod, Prison Abolition, supra note 40, at 1161. 
152. Id.; McLeod, Abolition Democracy, supra note 24; DAVIS, supra note 39; Akbar, Abolitionist 
Horizon, supra note 57. 
153. McLeod, Abolition Democracy, supra note 24, at 1638–40. 











Article: the contention that an abolitionist ethic demands a far more nuanced 
response to police violence from those who seek to radically reduce the 
prison industrial complex rather than simply calling for the prosecution and 
imprisonment of individual police officers. 
Importantly, an abolitionist ethic applies not only to those who wish to 
see the criminal legal system abolished completely, but also to the many, 
many scholars and advocates who wish to see major decarceration without 
committing entirely to the more radical notion of abolition. The next Parts 
of the Article will show why a prison abolitionist ethic insists that we stop 
looking to the criminal legal system to stem the tide of police violence and 
turn instead to reducing of our reliance on police. 
An “abolitionist ethic” is a term introduced by Allegra McLeod. It is a 
way of looking at criminal legal system reform with an eye toward 
diminishing its power and footprint rather than tinkering at the margins with 
cosmetic reforms that do little to change the inherently rotten structures in 
place. This abolitionist ethic is useful not just for those who wish to abolish 
prisons entirely, but also for those who seek to radically reduce the criminal 
legal system’s footprint, even if they cannot envision a world entirely free 
from prisons.154 While important conversations are happening around how 
to define the scholarly concept of prison abolition,155 this Article suggests 
that the precise contours of that discussion are not necessary to show that 
advocating criminal legal solutions to police violence is an obstacle to the 
reduction of the criminal legal system that many scholars and advocates 
claim to desire. 
McLeod writes of her term “abolitionist ethic”: 
 If prison abolition is conceptualized as an immediate and 
indiscriminate opening of prison doors—that is, the imminent 
physical elimination of all structures of incarceration—rejection of 
abolition is perhaps warranted. But abolition may be understood 
instead as a gradual project of decarceration, in which radically 
different legal and institutional regulatory forms supplant criminal 
law enforcement.156  
An abolitionist ethic envisions “a transformative goal of gradual 
decarceration and positive regulatory substitution wherein penal regulation 
 
154. See GOTTSCHALK, supra note 14, at 17 (noting that even those who call for the United States 
to look more like European countries are considered “idealistic”).  
155. Compare DAVIS, supra note 39, at 9 (noting that many assume self-styled “antiprison 
activists” are merely “trying to ameliorate prison conditions or perhaps to reform the prison in more 
fundamental ways.”), with McLeod, Prison Abolition, supra note 40, at 1161 (noting that many 
incorrectly believe prison abolitionists want to immediately open the doors to all prisons). 












is recognized as morally unsustainable.”157 Importantly, once abolition is 
viewed in these terms, “inattention to abolition in criminal law scholarship 
and reformist discourses comes into focus as a more troubling absence.”158 
In other words, the “reformist critiques” that many scholars engage in 
concern only the “peripheral excesses of imprisonment and prison-backed 
policing.”159 Moreover, as this Article has argued, reformist critiques tend 
to go by the wayside when reformers are confronted by bad actors whom 
they see as particularly harmful.160 Indeed, many are willing to return to 
increases in criminal law and pro-carceral changes in criminal procedure 
when a seemingly new problem arises.161 
In order to understand why attempting to increase the number and 
harshness of police prosecutions will legitimize and prop up our current 
system without achieving accountability and systemic change for police 
departments, it is important to understand the ways in which all criminal 
law and prosecutions impede the larger goal of systemic reduction of harm. 
Several key tenets of prison abolitionist ethics are particularly germane in 
the police prosecution context. They can be split into two main categories. 
First is the inherent illegitimacy of our current prison-backed criminal legal 
system, and second is the space that a future without prisons gives us to 
imagine how we could truly invest in safety through education, welfare 
reform, restorative justice, and citizen-alternatives to law enforcement. 
Perhaps the central tenet of a prison abolitionist ethic is the “rejection of 
the moral legitimacy of confining people in cages.”162 This notion views 
prisons, as currently constituted, as a form of torture, and the caging of 
human beings as a fundamentally problematic response to bad actions even 
if it functions to deter crime.163 This is particularly so given the ordinary 
prison conditions in America. 
The general public tends to be shielded from the realities of life inside 
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it tends to be in contexts of extremes like solitary confinement.165 These 
glimpses into particularly horrific prison practices allow us to assume that 
prison in general, while “unpleasant,”166 is not unacceptable. As one 
incarcerated person-turned-author notes, “literature describing [ordinary] 
prison [conditions] as a site of trauma is . . . uncommon.”167 
A prison abolitionist ethic insists that we confront the ordinary trauma 
of prison, including experiencing or witnessing extreme violence, rape, 
verbal abuse, hypervigilance, PTSD, and degradation. Mika’il DeVeaux, 
who spent twenty-five years incarcerated, writes of witnessing a person’s 
skull smashed by a baseball bat, and another person stabbed in the back with 
an ice pick. He writes, “[v]iolence permeated the prison atmosphere. I lived 
in a constant state of paranoia. The rampant possibility of violence reminded 
me of a dark side I had previously thought only existed in nightmares and 
stories told to errant youth to frighten them into silence or obedience.”168 
DeVeaux writes that he was so afraid of being raped in prison that he yelled 
“‘nobody is going to fuck me,’ while brandishing two makeshift ice picks 
during a gathering in a common room.”169 He recalls being called a N***** 
by guards.170 Another former incarcerated person-turned-lawyer, Tarra 
Simmons notes other “ordinary” traumas of life inside a prison: “having to 
be strip-searched constantly, having to be dehumanized, and the trauma to 
. . . family and . . . children.”171 
Every now and then, ordinary prison conditions make the news cycle. 
Parchman, a maximum-security prison in Mississippi that incarcerates 
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roughly 3,600172 men, has recently been scrutinized due to a number of 
deaths in the prison. In January 2020 alone, there were nine reported173 
deaths, one of which was by suicide, the rest killed by other incarcerated 
people.174 The prison is now under scrutiny for its “unconstitutional and 
inhumane”175 conditions. Photos176 taken from inside the prison reveal its 
unacceptable conditions: moldy showers, exposed wires, clogged drains, 
holes in walls, broken toilets, rotten food, and many makeshift weapons.177 
In June 2019, the Department of Health released a report178 documenting 
the substandard living conditions at Parchman,179 which include: no power, 
no lights, no hot water, no cold water, no water at all, mold, no mattresses, 
rat infestation, no pillows, and bird nests in windows.180 In another recent 
example, New Yorkers became aware of jail conditions in the winter of 
2019, when the Metropolitan Detention Complex, a federal jail in Brooklyn, 
lost power. The 1,600 people inside were on lockdown in freezing, dark 
cells for weeks.181 At the other extreme, 80% of Texas’s 150,000 
incarcerated people live without air conditioning in an area of the country 
that regularly sees temperatures exceed 100 degrees. Not surprisingly, 
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numerous deaths have been reported from these conditions.182 And, of 
courses, Texas is not alone; many other states have been sued in wrongful 
death and other lawsuits due to extreme heat in their prisons. In 2012, a 
federal judge ordered a Louisiana facility to lower its temperature from 109 
degrees to 88 degrees.183 
These are, of course, only a few examples of what an “ordinary” prison 
experience consists of. None of these inhumane experiences is considered 
in formulating punishments. Prison is still seen as simply a “term of 
years,”184 meted out with no regard for the multitude of traumas inflicted on 
individuals by the experience.185 
Another way that the abolitionist ethic challenges our reliance on the 
criminal legal system is to argue that prison does nothing to recompense 
victims of crime. Speaking in the police context, McLeod notes that “the 
conviction and incarceration of police who have perpetrated violence do not 
offer tangible recompense to survivors and others who have been 
harmed.”186 We can see how little the criminal legal system cares about 
complaining witnesses by looking at the way prosecutors treat people who 
desire less harshness. Indeed, prosecutors who tout their care for “victims” 
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routinely ignore those victims who desire mercy for defendants in their 
cases187 or who may even prefer a non-criminal solution.188 
Further, prison fails to deter many crimes, particularly those that are a 
result of systemic factors.189 Indeed, in many cases, prison exacerbates the 
harms that it aims to solve. Numerous studies over many years have shown 
that prison has a criminogenic effect on those who are incarcerated.190 
Whether this is because of the degradation prison inflicts,191 the lack of 
opportunity available to those who are released,192 the negative influences 
that incarcerated people have on each other,193 or myriad other reasons, 
prison does not turn people into “law abiding citizens.”194 Much lip service 
is paid to the notion that the criminal legal system is the best, if not the only, 
way to stop criminality. Yet this argument is belied time and again by the 
experiences and actions of those who have been released. 
The demonstrated inefficacy of prison may well be tied to another facet 
of the prison abolitionist ethic: the criminal legal system replicates the racial 
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pathologies and violence it aims to stem rather than solve.195 The direct links 
from slavery to Jim Crow to incarceration have been well documented by 
many scholars.196 Similarly, the obstacles to reintegrating into society after 
prison are well-known.197 Importantly, however, it is key to understand that, 
because of the way the system is administered, any change to the criminal 
legal system that ratchets it up will fall most heavily on the shoulders of 
marginalized people of color.198 For example, when self-styled feminists199 
successfully recalled Judge Aaron Persky,200 who was roundly criticized for 
giving too light a sentence to Brock Turner, the “Stanford Rapist” and a 
wealthy white man,201 commentators noted that Persky had been known for 
sentencing all defendants more lightly.202 In other words, Californians 
 
195. McLeod, Prison Abolition, supra note 40, at 1197 (“The deep, structural, and both conscious 
and unconscious entanglement of racial degradation and criminal law enforcement presents a strong case 
for aspiring to abandon criminal regulatory frameworks in favor of other social regulatory projects, 
rather than aiming for more modest criminal law reform.”). 
196. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN AN 
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2020). 
197. See, e.g., Levine, Discipline and Policing, supra note 192, at 889–96 (describing barriers to 
reintegration for those with a criminal record); John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan 
Masur, Happiness and Punishment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1063 (2009) (“The social and economic 
effects of having served time in prison can be extremely serious. As we outlined in Part I, prisoners often 
witness the breakups of their marriages and relationships while in prison and have greater difficulty 
forming other relationships (including friendships) upon their release. They experience greater rates of 
unemployment. Ex-prisoners also suffer from more debilitating health problems and far higher rates of 
incurable diseases than the general population. And as we describe above, unlike the loss of money—or 
even, to some degree, permanent physical injuries—these types of afflictions have severe long-term 
hedonic effects and are very difficult to adapt to. In particular, unemployment and the dissolution of 
social ties are two of the most reliable predictors of long-term unhappiness and anxiety.”). 
198. See, e.g., Law Professors’ Statement for the Independence of the Judiciary and Against the 
Recall of Santa Clara County Superior Court Judge Aaron Persky (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.paloalto 
online.com/news/reports/1503112952.pdf [https://perma.cc/N3K8-QPGT] (“[H]istorically and 
empirically, recall actions push judges towards sharply ratcheting up sentences, especially against the 
poor and people of color . . . .”); Sexual Assault Law—Judicial Recall—California Judge Recalled for 
Sentence in Sexual Assault Case, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1369, 1372 (2019) [hereinafter Sexual Assault 
Law] (noting that many law professors in California opposed the recall of Judge Aaron Persky). 
199. See Sexual Assault Law, supra note 198, at 1372 (“[P]roponents of the recall viewed it as a 
vote against the normalization of rape culture.”); Robin Abcarian, Recall Effort of Judge in Stanford 
Rape Case Gains Steam and Political Allies, L.A. TIMES (July 8, 2016, 3:00 AM), https://www.latimes.c 
om/local/abcarian/la-me-abcarian-judge-recall-20160708-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/R4VC-LV 
VG] (“Feminist groups like the National Organization for Women and the Feminist Majority . . . signed 
on to the recall. ‘We are working with our supporters to mobilize in support, including raising funds, for 
the campaign,’ said Katherine Spillar of the Feminist Majority. ‘We are just getting started.’”). 
200. Maggie Astor, California Voters Remove Judge Aaron Persky, Who Gave a 6-Month 
Sentence for Sexual Assault, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/06/us/politi 
cs/judge-persky-brock-turner-recall.html [https://perma.cc/56R3-WG6S]. 
201. Damon Young, The Stanford Sexual Assault Case: A White Privilege Cake with Vanilla 
Frosting on Top, GUARDIAN (June 9, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/jun/09/standfor 
d-rape-case-white-privilege-brock-turner [https://perma.cc/N9B3-XN3F] (arguing colorfully that the 
sentence was “a . . . lesson plan for recognizing white privilege and rape culture”). 














recalled a judge who would apply the law less harshly to the many poor 
people of color who came before him. In doing so, they also signaled to all 
judges that leniency but not harshness may jeopardize their positions on the 
bench.203  
Similarly, harsh sentencing laws, often passed in the name of children 
who are the victims of abduction and murder,204 lead to thousands of longer 
sentences for people with numerous convictions.205 Of course, as the 
pipeline from arrest to prosecution to conviction is often racially 
determined, this means that those who are incarcerated for life because of 
“three-strikes” type laws are, again, poor people of color.206 A prison 
abolitionist ethic insists that we see all criminal legal ratcheting as 
perpetuating the already appalling racism built into our system.207 
The above paragraphs detail the many reasons a prison abolitionist ethic 
counsels us to acknowledge the horrors and failures of prison. A second, 
and equally important, part of an abolitionist ethic, however, looks to a 
brighter future without prisons. Most people are unable to conceive of a 
world without prisons. As Angela Y. Davis writes: “The prison is 
considered so ‘natural’ that it is extremely hard to imagine life without it.”208 
An imagined world where billions of dollars are not invested in 
incarcerating people gives us the chance to envision ways to promote the 
important values of safety and security without the pain and torture of 
prison.209 It shows us that when we free ourselves from seeing the criminal 
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legal system as the best, if not only, response to societal problems, we can 
reinvest in potentially more useful solutions.210 As Davis writes: 
 An abolitionist approach . . . would require us to imagine a 
constellation of alternative strategies and institutions 
[including] . . . demilitarization of schools, revitalization of 
education at all levels, a health system that provides free physical and 
mental care to all, and a justice system based on reparation and 
reconciliation rather than retribution and vengeance.211 
In other words, once we free ourselves from seeing the criminal legal system 
as the best or only solution to bad acts, we are able to envision other ways 
to ensure that basic societal needs for safety and security are met. As prison 
abolitionist Mariame Kaba has said, “Prison abolition is . . . the building up 
of new ways of . . . relating with each other.”212And there are grassroots 
organizations that are already doing the work an abolitionist ethic allows us 
to imagine. They are proposing alternatives to police.213 And they are 
imagining different forms of accountability in the form of transformative214 
and restorative justice.215 These practices force people to reckon personally 
with those they have harmed.216 
Seeking alternatives to criminal prosecution and prisons is perhaps 
uniquely useful when it comes to police who cause harm. The next Parts 
will endeavor to explain why. But, in brief: police violence shows us that 
we cannot equate the criminal legal system with safety and security.217 
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Police often cause violence in the name of safety and security.218 This 
violence is often not due to an individual officer’s personal evil. Indeed, the 
history, training, and practices of the police encourage violence, a violence 
that the criminal legal system relies upon for its continued operation.219 
Moreover, turning our violent system against individual police officers will 
not promote the safety and security of overpoliced citizens. Believing then, 
that we can prosecute our way out of this violence leads us into the same 
fallacy that insists we rely on the police and on prison to be safe in the first 
place. Those who wish to stem this cycle must face the fact that prosecuting 
individual police officers both legitimizes the criminal legal system and 
further clouds the causes of police violence.220 
An abolitionist ethic facilitates our ability to see the problems with 
advocating for more criminal law and harsher procedure for police. The next 
Parts will more specifically address the particular ways in which these calls 
will be unlikely to resolve the problems of police violence against 
vulnerable citizens while perpetuating and legitimizing a system that has 
been shown time and again to be fundamentally flawed. 
III. POLICE PROSECUTIONS AS LEGITIMATION AND MIRROR OF THE 
CRIMINAL LEGAL SYSTEM 
This Part argues that the performance of trial and punishment of the few 
police officers who have been tried and convicted shows two very 
problematic signs. First, they show that the criminal legal system may be 
playing out the same racism in police trials that it does in its ordinary 
operations. Indeed, far from the hope that the law will mete out punishment 
in a way that advances racial justice, the recent trials and convictions of 
three officers of color, discussed at length below, suggest that police 
prosecutions may replay the worst racial pathologies of the criminal legal 
system.  
Worse, perhaps, these racial pathologies play out against defendants 
whose convictions many see as legitimizing the system. These police trials 
allow defenders of the status quo to claim the system is working and comfort 
those who might critique the system by suggesting that it has the capacity 
to vindicate victims of color and to change the vast systemic problems 
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A. Police Prosecutions Both Legitimate and Replay the Pathologies of the 
Criminal Legal System 
While scholarly lamentations focus on the ways in which the criminal 
legal system does not treat police defendants harshly enough, or as harshly 
as civilians, some recent trials of police officers have shown that in 
numerous ways the prosecution of police defendants mirrors some of the 
most problematic aspects of our criminal legal system. At the same time, 
prosecutors and other defenders of the status quo use successful police 
prosecutions as examples of how the system is working to reform itself, thus 
legitimizing and obfuscating the larger problems endemic to the system.222 
As one scholar puts it, “If the criminal justice system in America tends to 
tell the [problematic] story of dangerous Black men plaguing society with 
brutal crimes, the prosecution of the police can offer a new narrative, just as 
the innocence movement has.”223 
Even prison abolitionists tend to miss some of the most problematic 
aspects of police prosecutions. McLeod specifically addresses the 
prosecution and incarceration of police officers. While she argues that 
incarceration of officers does not recompense its victims,224 misses the 
systemic nature of police violence,225 legitimates more ordinary types of 
police violence,226 and, at least in the case of a life sentence, is 
fundamentally torture,227 she does not discuss two important aspects of 
police prosecutions. McLeod never addresses the many calls for prosecution 
among the grassroots organizations she highlights for their work on 
alternatives to prison, nor does she anticipate the possibility for the criminal 
legal system to play its racist pathologies out during the prosecutions of 
police officers.  
McLeod gives much credence to the important work done by grassroots 
organizations to promote alternatives to imprisonment even for the most 
violent and dangerous police officers.228 Yet, she ignores the many activists 
who do support incarcerating the police and the way these calls may be 
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contributing to racialized prosecutions of police.229 As this Article has 
already noted, activists and those who advocate for criminal defendants are 
often loud voices in favor of the prosecution and incarceration of police 
officers.230 More problematically, perhaps, left-leaning organizations like 
the ACLU and NAACP support these individual or grassroots calls for 
prosecution and incarceration,231 thus prioritizing the criminal legal system 
as the best way to ameliorate police violence. This, in turn, bolsters 
conventional law and order arguments that insist we rely on the criminal 
legal system more generally.232 
These calls from prominent civil rights advocates and activists make it 
easier for police departments to write accused officers off as bad apples. 
This is a problem I identify as “legitimation.” Legitimation works in two 
equally pernicious ways. First, as I will detail in the next section, it suggests 
to more casual onlookers that the criminal legal system is working out its 
own “kinks” by prosecuting the police who cause harm to marginalized 
citizens. If the system is seen as cleaning itself up through prosecution, the 
general public will be less likely to see the vast problems that still exist. 
Second, and relatedly, as I argue here, at least one of the biggest problems 
endemic to the system, racism, is playing itself out on the field of police 
prosecutions, with almost no notice from scholars or advocates.233  
For instance, although McLeod discusses the racist effects of both 
policing and prison, she does not connect the way that racist pathologies 
play out in the prosecution of police officers. As the Article will discuss in 
detail here, the individual prosecutions of officers in the past few years 
suggest one major risk of increased police prosecutions is the increased 
prosecution of officers of color. The recent trials of three officers of color 
suggest, at least, that the racial pathologies of the criminal legal system 
replay themselves in the tropes and language employed against them. This 
is particularly important because much of the energy behind prosecuting 
police who harm civilians is justified by the criminal legal system’s ability 
to remedy some of the vast harms caused by the police to individuals of 
color.234 Yet, I show here through a series of vignettes that, far from healing 
racial inequities present in the system, we see racism and racial tropes 
 
229. See supra Part I. 
230. McLeod, Abolition Democracy, supra note 24, at 1620–21, 1646–47.  
231. Id. 
232. Cf. GOTTSCHALK, supra note 14 at 276 (arguing that “national [civil rights organizations] 
will not lead the way out of the carceral state without pressure from a more radical flank”). 
233. See infra Part III.B. 
234. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Prosecuting Race, 48 DUKE L.J. 1157, 1228 (1999) (explaining 
that prosecutors who take on abusive police can be seen as “the heroic moral witness. On this 
construction, the prosecutor rises up as a historic witness to confront injustice . . . . [The idea urges a 
more expansive view of a prosecutor as a] heroic witness in the historical struggle for American racial 
dignity and equality.”). 











abound in the prosecutions of and discussions surrounding police who harm 
civilians. 
B. Three Case Studies  
This section looks at the way racial tropes employed in police officer 
trials have largely been ignored. Instead, these trials have largely amplified 
the myth that the criminal legal system can achieve justice for those affected 
by police brutality. While no rigorous statistical studies have been done to 
suss out the racial components of charges and convictions against police 
officers, anecdotal evidence suggests that the racial pathologies of the 
criminal legal system are playing out on the field of this supposedly 
“different” group of suspects and defendants. While a few white officers—
like Jason Van Dyke235 and Michael Slager,236 whose senseless brutality 
have been captured on camera—have been convicted237 or pled guilty238 to 
the killings of Black boys or men, some of the most “successful” 
prosecutions of officers have been of officers of color. Their trials raise 
serious questions for anyone who has faith that prosecuting police will right 
the racial harms imposed by the criminal legal system.239 While there is not 
enough information to draw conclusions about whether prosecutions are 
systematically racist, the following three vignettes illustrate that racial 
tropes and assumptions are alive and well in the criminal legal system’s 
response to police violence. 
1. Peter Liang 
In New York, much of the focus of the criminal legal system’s response 
to police brutality has been on the choking death of Eric Garner by Daniel 
Pantaleo.240 Pantaleo was not indicted by a Staten Island grand jury nor 
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charged federally.241 A less notorious killing, however, did result in trial and 
conviction. In 2016, rookie police officer Peter Liang shot and killed Akai 
Gurley, an unarmed Black man. Officer Liang was subsequently indicted 
for Gurley’s death, making him one of only three officers indicted over a 
span of fifteen years and 179 police-involved shootings in New York.242  
Liang killed Gurley, unarmed Black man, whom Liang never saw, while 
patrolling a housing project in Brooklyn.243 Liang was sent to the building 
to do “floor checks,” a technique where officers patrol the stairwell and each 
floor of a building looking for crime.244 Sometimes this technique is called 
“vertical patrol.”245 These patrols are a good example of how poor 
communities of color are overpoliced—officers sent simply to look for 
crime in public housing, 246 where people of color are overrepresented.247 As 
one author notes, these suspicionless searches are common: “more than 
156,000 were conducted in New York City Housing Authority” in one 
year.248 
Professor Gabriel J. Chin, who participated in Liang’s appeal, writes of 
the scene: 
Officers Liang and Landau went to the eighth floor, the top floor, of 
the building . . . . [T]here were two stairwells. One was lit; in the 
other, the lights were broken, so the stairwell was completely black. 
The officers decided to check the dark stairwell. Officer Liang 
removed his pistol from his holster, as is authorized by NYPD policy, 
and held his flashlight in his other hand. He looked through a porthole 
 
241. Id. 
242. J. Weston Phippen, Why Was Officer Peter Liang Convicted?, ATL. (Mar. 3, 2016), https://w 
ww.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2016/03/peter-liang-police-shooting/471687 [https://perma.cc/6C 
PW-8X3V]. 
243. Alan Feuer, Ex-New York Officer Gets 5 Years of Probation in Fatal Brooklyn Shooting, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/20/nyregion/peter-liang-ex-new-york-
police-officer-sentenced-akai-gurley-shooting-death-brooklyn.html. 
244. Id. 
245. Id.; Michael Schwirtz, Public Housing Controls Can Mean Safety or Danger, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 21, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/22/nyregion/housing-patrols-can-mean-safety-or-p 
eril-to-residents.html [https://perma.cc/G6UW-8U3Y] (“[In New York City,] vertical patrols [are] 
routine up-and-down inspections of stairwells and hallways [of public housing].”). 
246. Schwirtz, supra note 245 (“[V]ertical patrols . . . are meant to keep criminals at bay in the 
city’s 334 public housing developments.”); Adam Carlis, Note, The Illegality of Vertical Patrols, 109 
COLUM. L. REV. 2002, 2003 (2009) (“Vertical patrols consist of two or more police officers combing 
the interior of a public housing building—from roof to basement—in an attempt to locate and apprehend 
trespassers, drug dealers, and other criminals. As part of the patrol, the officers stop and systematically 
question whomever they encounter.” (citations omitted)). 
247. Housing Conditions, WHERE WE LIVE NYC, https://wherewelive.cityofnewyork.us/explore-
data/housing-conditions/ [https://perma.cc/7K7C-RTDV] (“Black and Hispanic households account for 
over 60% of households in all four categories of publicly supported housing in HUD-provided data; the 
share ranges from 61% in other HUD multifamily programs to 89% in public housing.”). 
248. Carlis, supra note 246, at 2003. 











in the door but could not hear or see anything on the other side. He 
opened the door to the eighth floor stairwell with his shoulder, 
looking up the stairs toward the roof. He heard a noise from the 
seventh floor stairwell and involuntarily discharged his pistol, a 9mm 
Glock. His pistol was pointed downward, toward the ground, as he 
was trained. In a freak accident, the bullet travelled down the 
staircase between the seventh and eighth floors, hit and ricocheted off 
the wall of the stairway, and struck Mr. Gurley in the heart. The 
wound was immediately fatal.249 
In these facts, we see numerous systemic problems of policing laid bare 
at the feet of one criminally-sanctioned officer. First is the policy: virtual 
sweeps in public housing are exactly the kind of police activity that is likely 
to trap people of color in the criminal legal system and put police officers 
in situations where, as evidenced by the killing of Mr. Gurley, a violent 
mistake may occur.250 And here the stage is set: a rookie officer, patrolling 
a public housing unit, not looking for any crime specifically,251 in a dark 
stairwell, trained to see danger everywhere,252 armed with a deadly weapon, 
makes a mistake. Instead of seeing this as a moment to grapple with why 
rookie police officers are doing vertical patrols of housing units while 
exhausted and trained to fear the residents, the public and politicians 
immediately turned to the criminal legal system to condemn Liang as an 
individual bad actor.253 
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Liang was charged with and convicted of second-degree manslaughter 
by a Brooklyn jury.254 Not only does this conviction raise questions about 
what role race plays in who is and is not convicted in the criminal legal 
system, but it also shows the legitimating function that even the conviction 
of non-white officers has played. As Chin notes, “[e]ven among academics, 
who have time and inclination to consider facts, Mr. Liang’s case is grouped 
indiscriminately with other killings which involved intentional applications 
of force by officers, who knew the race of the victim.”255 In fact, the case 
was called an example of “white police officers executing unarmed Black 
men, or meting out the death penalty.”256 Liang’s race was erased in the rush 
to criminally condemn a vision of white police brutality. 
Members of Liang’s community in Chinatown attempted to raise the role 
that race was playing in his trial. But their voices were drowned out by the 
outrage over what was seen as Liang’s “light” sentence of probation and 
community service and the judge’s perceived bias in favor of a police 
officer.257 
Meanwhile, the systemic problems with the NYPD that led to this tragic 
incident went unmentioned. Indeed, the prosecutor’s summation is worth 
quoting at some length to demonstrate the pains it took to distance Liang 
from the rest of the New York Police Department: “Peter Liang is not the 
same as the police officers who bravely keep us safe every day,” the 
prosecutor told the jury.258 “Convicting Peter Liang is not a conviction of 
the New York City Police Department.”259 He characterized the rest of the 
department as “proud, brave cops who go out every day and patrol every 
day and every night to keep us safe.”260 Lest the prosecution be seen as a 
condemnation of the NYPD more generally, the prosecutor continued, 
“[w]e honor those cops. We applaud those cops. But Peter Liang falls short 
of that. Peter Liang is not one of those cops.”261 Liang’s conduct violated 
our basic social contract with police, the prosecutor informed the jury: “the 
police have a sacred trust that they fulfill, a sacred trust with each 
community. That trust is that the police department commits to thoroughly 
train its officers before arming them with deadly weapons and sending them 
into our communities.”262 While this might lead one to think the prosecutor 
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was questioning how well that training worked, he was clearly not: “police 
officers go through rigorous and thorough training.” Liang’s crime, the 
prosecutor said, was to “[intentionally] disregard that training.”263 
It should come as no surprise then, that the NYPD did no soul searching 
and changed no policies with regard to its vertical patrols in housing 
projects.264 As the NYPD’s spokesperson noted after the conviction, “it was 
unlikely” the conviction would prompt changes in the way officers patrol.265 
“The unique circumstances of this case cannot dictate specific policy 
because it was a very specific set of circumstances . . . . You must factor in 
the particular situation, perception and conditions of each case in order to 
make a fair critique.”266 In other words, the NYPD was with the assistance 
of the criminal legal system able to contextualize this as a result of one bad 
officer, not a bad set of policies. 
2. Mohammed Noor 
In Minnesota, another officer of color, Mohammed Noor, who had been 
a police officer for less than two years, faced a much more draconian 
sentence than Liang had for the killing of a white woman, Justine 
Damond.267 In 2015, Noor, a Somali-American officer responded late at 
night to a 911 call of a reported rape. When Damond approached the squad 
car, Noor shot and killed her. His attorney argued that he heard his partner 
say, “oh Jesus” and believed they were being “ambushed,” a situation that 
officers were trained to fear during their time in the police academy.268  
Relevantly, this shooting came only two weeks after two police officers 
in New York were ambushed and killed in their squad car.269 That event was 
widely publicized by law enforcement and the media as a “war on cops,” 
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allegedly perpetrated in response to heightened criticisms after the killings 
of Garner and Gurley in New York City.270  
Noor was found guilty of intentional murder and manslaughter.271 His 
conviction marked the first time a Minnesota police officer was convicted 
of killing someone in the line of duty out of 179 police-involved shootings 
in Minnesota since 2000. 272 The first officer charged since 2000 was 
Jeronimo Yanez, another non-white officer, who killed Philando Castile, a 
Black, legal gun owner whose death was captured on video. Yanez was 
acquitted in 2016.273 Notably, until 2020, and the killing of George Floyd, 
white officers who had killed unarmed Black men in the Twin Cities were 
never charged.274 
At Noor’s trial, racial tropes endemic to the criminal legal system played 
themselves out in unsurprising ways. Images of white, female innocence, a 
common theme in cross-racial crimes throughout history,275 played a 
noticeable role at Noor’s trial. One observer noted that in questioning Noor 
about his claim that he feared for his life, the prosecutor repeated back to 
him his own description of the victim, stating, “[t]he whole blonde hair, pink 
T-shirt and all is a threat to you?”276 Prosecutors also described the mostly 
white neighborhood where the killing took place as “a quiet, safe place 
where homicides are rare.”277 At least two witnesses testified that they were 
surprised that a “shooting would happen in the affluent southwest part of 
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the city, as opposed to the north side, which is heavily African-
American.”278 
While the Somali American Police Association charged that Noor was 
scapegoated because of his race,279 the larger police union accepted his 
conviction with equanimity—a very unusual stance for a police union.280 
Police unions usually stand by their members, often issuing inflammatory 
statements whenever an officer is charged in a civilian’s death.281 Here the 
Union simply stated that it respected the judicial process.282 The Hennepin 
prosecutor’s office, rather than grapple with the fact that it has only charged 
officers of color in on-duty shootings, claimed that “[r]ace has never been a 
factor in any of my decisions, it never will be.”283 Thus, there is very little 
reason to believe that the outcome in this case will lead to soul searching on 
the part of any actors in the Minnesota criminal legal apparatus.  
Activists and civil rights organizations were more critical of the 
conviction of a Black officer, but they too missed the forest for the trees. 
The local chapter of the NAACP did note that “the case was a ‘scapegoat’ 
against a man of color to fool residents into thinking ‘the police force is 
in tact.’”284 Yet the general tenor of such comments was that white officers 
were not being prosecuted rather than that the criminal legal system was 
not the field on which to remedy the systemic problems of policing. 
Another local activist noted that, “[t]here would have been no trial if 
Noor’s victim was African American or Native American, and I think the 
vast majority of people in our movement believe that.”285 In other words, 
even those critical of the decision saw it as a problem for the criminal 
legal system to work out. 
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The verdict was commented on not for its replaying of the racial 
harshness of the system toward Black defendants, but rather as sign that the 
system should vindicate the rights of Black victims. The ACLU noted the 
racial bias exhibited by the conviction of Officer Noor but chose to condemn 
the lack of convictions in cases where Black men had been killed rather than 
use the moment to remind its audience that the criminal legal system will 
not and cannot vindicate the rights of people of color, victim or defendant.286 
This is a problematic, if not surprising, stance from an organization that 
rarely, if ever, encourages the use of the criminal legal system.287 It 
underscores once again the prominent role the criminal legal system is 
expected to play in righting societal wrongs, even in the minds of those who 
are generally aware of its brokenness.288 
3. Nouman Raja 
Finally, in South Florida, Nouman Raja, a Pakistani-American officer, 
was the first police officer charged in twenty-six years and the first 
convicted in thirty years for an on-duty killing in Florida.289 Raja, who was 
a probationary officer on the force for less than a year,290 was convicted of 
manslaughter for the killing of Corey Jones, a Black motorist who was 
stranded on the highway. Raja, who was not wearing his uniform, shot 
Jones, a legal gun owner, when Jones pulled out his weapon and attempted 
to run from the officer.291 Raja was sentenced to twenty-five years in 
prison.292  
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The government claimed that Raja’s conviction would heal the victims 
and vindicate the legal system without tarnishing in any way the larger 
police system in Miami. The State’s Attorney called Jones’ death an “open 
wound in our community” and alleged that Raja’s conviction could “heal” 
that wound.293 He made clear that Raja was an “aberration” whose actions 
should not reflect on other officers who worked “day and night to keep our 
community safe.”294 For the prosecutor who tried the case, the verdict 
“signifie[d] that justice is blind and we really have a great system, [in which] 
justice can be served no matter who you are, no matter how much money 
you have.”295 And that while “our criminal justice system can be slow . . . it 
is the best system we have.”296 
Prosecutors, however, were far from the only people commenting on the 
significance of the conviction and sentence. Benjamin Crump, the lawyer 
for a number of Black victims of police violence, “described the conviction 
and sentencing of Raja as a ‘milestone for many Black Americans’ who 
have lost loved ones in police shootings only to see the officers responsible 
for the deaths not face charges.”297 He went further to say that, “[t]here is 
hope for America because a jury in Palm Beach, Florida, looked at all the 
evidence and they said a black man killed by the police can get equal justice, 
can get fair administration of the law.”298  
The ACLU of Florida also saw the verdict as a larger referendum on 
policing and believed that the verdict was the result of advocacy by 
community groups and would redound to their benefit.299 In a press release 
following the verdict, the long-time civil rights organization celebrated the 
“heartening” signal of greater use of the criminal legal system after “26 
years [where no] officer was charged” for “an on-duty killing in Florida.”300 
The ACLU went on: 
 We hope that this step in the right direction keeps the wheels of 
justice turning. Because people marched, rallied and demanded that 
the criminal justice system hold Raja accountable for his actions, it 
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could not look the other way. Together, we will continue to work with 
organizations and activists across the state to achieve real police 
reform and make changes in policing that will make more officers 
accountable for their actions, and end the epidemic of police violence 
in Black and brown communities.301 
No mention is made in any of these statements that the officer convicted 
in this case was a person of color. Only Raja’s family seemed to take note 
of this. His brother told a newspaper that the conviction had to do with race 
“because we’re not dark enough. As an American Muslim . . . we’re not 
light enough, we’re not dark enough.”302 
Along with the lack of reflection of how race played out in the charging 
and conviction of Raja, there was similarly no reflection on how holding 
this individual officer responsible could lead to changes in the way the 
police behave in Miami. This is troubling because the killing of Corey Jones 
was just a recent example of the brutality and racism exhibited by the 
department, which has been monitored since 2013 by the Department of 
Justice after scathing reports about its tendency to brutalize people of 
color.303 If one is to believe those involved in the Raja case, however, this 
conviction is all that was needed to stem the tide of violence in Miami. 
Indeed, the police department and the criminal legal system in Miami 
emerged from the trial propped up by their proponents and those who often 
critique these institutions. 
These three vignettes should serve as a warning to those who believe the 
criminal legal system can hold police and their departments accountable for 
harm caused to people of color. If racial justice is a central reason for 
supporting police prosecutions, there is strong anecdotal evidence that a 
different response is required. As the next Part shows, there is no reason to 
believe that these prosecutions will reduce police brutality either. Indeed, 
they are instead a red herring, stealing our attention away from the systemic 
violence that is ongoing and unlikely to resolve without a fundamental shift 
in our reliance on police to address social problems. 
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IV. POLICE PROSECUTIONS ARE UNLIKELY TO REDUCE POLICE VIOLENCE 
This Part suggests why prosecuting individual officers may not only be 
incapable of reducing police violence but may even exacerbate the problem 
by distracting our attention from the larger systemic forces that lead to 
excessive force by police. It argues that police prosecutions ignore the 
thousands of legal violences police perpetrate daily. It will conclude by 
suggesting that the best way to reduce police violence is to reduce our 
reliance on the police and will gesture to scholarship and activism that is 
already endeavoring to realize these alternatives. 
A. Police Violence Is Systemic 
As the last Part argued, prosecuting police both replays the racial 
pathologies of the criminal legal system and falsely promises that, by 
holding “bad apples” accountable through criminal prosecution, we can 
reduce problematic policing policies, including police violence.304 It 
showed how this bad-apple approach may exacerbate rather than ameliorate 
the racial pathologies that plague the criminal legal system. But another 
equally important reason that focusing on criminal liability is problematic 
in the policing context is that individual prosecutions will do little to reform 
policing. 
This Part will argue that individual prosecutions will not reduce police 
violence because police violence is systemic. In fact, focusing on individual 
bad actors is likely to turn our attention away from where it is needed: on 
the systemic violence and racism inherent in policing organizations and 
structures. 
A central tenet of prison abolition is to recognize that crime and violence 
are often systemic and cyclical, the product of deprivation, childhood 
trauma, and a racist, capital-driven society unwilling to invest in welfare, 
education, and other front-end solutions.305 Instead we invest millions in 
policing,306 prosecution, and prison at the back end.307 But this abolitionist 
ethic should also encourage us to look at police crimes as systemic rather 
than individual and similarly impossible to fix through criminal legal 
solutions. 
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As Barbara Armacost argues, “[T]he current accountability paradigm—
targeting the officer who pulled the trigger—is actually hindering genuine 
progress in decreasing the numbers of these tragedies, including those 
motivated by racism.”308 Armacost views most police violence through the 
lens of “tragic organizational accidents.”309 Despite the hopes for reform 
that are on display when a bad-acting officer is prosecuted or convicted, the 
belief that such individual-targeting solutions will lead to change is one of 
the major obstacles to actually reducing police violence. “Ironically, the 
sense of order we get from blaming individual bad performance—the belief 
that blaming will bring change—is an illusion” when it comes to 
. . . “complex organizations” like police departments and policing policy 
more generally.310 
In complex organizations, the visible bad actor has “inherit[ed] [a] 
situation[] with latent failures and errors inherent in [it].”311 This kind of 
language strikes as a deep understatement when we consider modern 
American policing, with its roots firmly planted in white supremacy and 
violent domination of social underclasses.312 Moreover, policing’s well-
documented development as a way to manage and control poor people and 
people of color is an extremely important factor to understanding why 
police prosecutions will not reduce police violence.313 
As Elizabeth Hinton describes it, both historically and currently, 
investment into police departments to manage poor and marginalized 
neighborhoods leads to violence by the police.314 One vivid historical 
example from Hinton’s book is the “Stop the Robberies, Enjoy Safe Streets 
(STRESS)” program that received $35,000 in 1971 as part of a $7.6 million 
grant to Michigan from the federal government for law enforcement.315 
STRESS was designed to “patrol . . . low-income, mostly black 
neighborhoods” in Detroit.316 This program was far from unique; it was 
based on other law enforcement operations in big cities throughout the 
country.317 
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Plainclothes STRESS officers placed themselves “in peril so as to invite 
robbery and other street crime,” to prove out their bosses’ predictions that 
such crimes were taking place in the neighborhoods they were funded to 
patrol.318 Then, “when confronted by the very situations they sought to 
provoke . . . they . . . react[ed] with force.” In fifteen months, these officers 
“killed a young, black male roughly once a month.”319 They also arrested 
6,000 people in three years.320 They brought negative attention to 
themselves when an all-white STRESS force killed a Black law 
enforcement officer, and the unit was eventually disbanded.321 But, as those 
who understand the organizational issues with policing might guess, 
STRESS was “considered an anomaly” by the “larger criminal justice 
community.”322 
The inability or refusal to reflect within the law enforcement community, 
exemplified by its reaction to STRESS, is exactly the kind of problem 
exacerbated by targeting “bad apple” police officers who commit violence. 
They are seen as aberrant rather than reflective of a system prone to deadly 
error. Armacost provides valuable insight into how police departments 
operate as other complex systems do, such as airlines or universities.323 She 
highlights several ways in which the structure of policing organizations 
makes them particularly susceptible to fatal but unintentional error-making 
on the part of individual officers. Police organizations have the 
characteristics of the most problematic organizations from the perspective 
of error-making: they are both “complex” and “tightly coupled.”324  
Police organizations are complex in that they have numerous non-linear 
goals. They have “many goals and tasks; for example, investigating crimes, 
preventing crimes, promoting public safety, enforcing traffic laws, 
responding to citizen reports and complaints, conducting public welfare 
checks, leading educational programs in schools and other institutions, and 
taking mentally ill people into protective custody.”325 Moreover, these tasks 
do not unfold predictably.326 In addition, police organizations are “tightly 
coupled,” which means that “whatever happens in one [part of the system] 
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automatically and directly affects what happens in the other.”327 Such 
organizations cannot “tolerate delay” and have “very little flexibility.”328 In 
the officer/citizen encounter, this means that “actions police are able to 
take . . . will depend upon reflex actions, training, and discipline rather than 
reasoned intervention to address the particular system breakdown at 
hand.”329 Police organizations pressure officers to “move on” without 
questioning actions they have taken, and to “contain risk.”330 According to 
Armacost, these pressures “escalate[] [interactions] and reduce[] the 
possibilities for preventing harm.”331 In other words, police organizations’ 
complexity and tight coupling means that they are particularly susceptible 
to system errors and that back-end, individual-blame solutions are 
particularly unlikely to prevent future errors from happening.332 This is 
particularly true because such individual solutions prevent larger systemic 
reflection or review.333 
Mining organizational literature, Armacost makes the point plainly: “The 
point is not that safety cannot be improved at the operator level, but that 
improving safety at that level will never solve the problem if latent defects 
and failures plague the entire system.”334 It ignores the multiple other actors 
and events that have led, sometimes inexorably, to a particular act of 
violence: 
 Many other actors may have contributed to the circumstances or 
increased the risks that led to the fatal moment; for example, the 
dispatcher who sent the officer to the scene, the supervisors who 
wrote the use-of-force policies, the managers who trained on those 
policies, the magistrate who signed an arrest warrant, or the 
legislature that set the terms of the officer’s arrest authority. 
Nonhuman factors, such as overtime or moon-lighting policies that 
promote overwork, unenforced discipline rules, patterns of repeated 
risk-taking behavior, pressure to effectuate quotas of arrests or stops, 
stop-and-frisk policies, laws that define crimes and regulate police 
powers, and cultural patterns that promote over-aggressive policing, 
may also have contributed to the officer’s actions.335 
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In other words, even if it is possible in limited circumstances to deter police 
violence through “bad apple” targeting, the “defects” systemic to policing 
will continue to go unrecognized and unsolved. 
Where this Article differs from Armacost’s assessment is that she writes 
ahistorically of the police, believing that we can ameliorate deep structural 
racism and heteropatriarchy by treating police as modern organizations 
whose systemic flaws can be reduced by understanding the organizational 
flaws that lead to violence and correcting them.336 On the other hand, this 
Article, situated in abolitionist literature, argues that there is no “fix” to the 
flaws of policing other than drastically reducing our societal belief and 
investment in and reliance on the police.337 As Amna Akbar has argued, 
police “reform” has so far continued to promote investing money into police 
organizations.338 Armacost’s solutions would continue this trend rather than 
recognizing that divestment from the police and reinvestment in alternative 
projects to secure communities may be the best method of reform.339 
Furthermore and connectedly, Armacost’s orientation is not “against” 
the criminal legal system.340 She does not situate the flawed organizational 
complexity of police departments within the larger “organization” of the 
criminal law enforcement machine: racially segregated policing,341 
legislators addicted to criminal statutes,342 prosecutors who exercise their 
discretion in harsh, merciless, racist ways,343 prison officials who allow 
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brutal inhumane living conditions to persist,344 and private citizens who 
judge and discriminate against the formerly incarcerated.345 And, to make 
the circle complete, citizens who rely on the police for order maintenance 
without concern for the effect an arrest may have on another individual.346 
B. Most Police Violence Is Legal  
Many police shootings are ruled “justified.”347 This has led scholars to 
try to rewrite self-defense statutes for the police. As I argue above, this is 
exactly the kind of solution that will continue the dominance of the criminal 
legal system as our response to all social problems.348 But police commit 
violence against citizens every day, violence that does not result in death 
and usually does not come to the attention of the general public. This kind 
of violence ranges from obvious harm, like using extreme force to arrest 
suspects, and SWAT team raids that end in injury and death. But it is also 
more “minor” forms of violence: handcuffs that pinch and tear at skin, 
shoving someone against a wall for a stop and frisk, banging of a suspect’s 
head on a police car door, ignoring ill suspects’ requests for medication or 
to be taken to a hospital. These more micro-violences happen thousands of 
times a day and are basically ignored or encouraged by the courts and the 
public.349 
Indeed, police violence is so common and so commonly accepted that it 
is considered by many to be a feature rather than a bug in the criminal legal 
system. As Paul Butler has noted with regard to police violence against 
people of color, these acts of violence are: 
[F]eatures of policing and punishment in the United States. They are 
how the system is supposed to work. This is why some reform efforts 
are doomed. They are trying to fix a system that is not actually 
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broken. The most far-reaching racial subordination stems not from 
illegal police misconduct, but rather from legal police conduct.350 
Most reform, including the prosecution of officers who commit the rare, 
potentially illegal violence, ignores the true aggregate harm of completely 
acceptable violence and subordination baked, historically and systemically, 
into policing in America. 
The willful ignorance of acceptable forms of violence pervades all police 
reform that relies on the criminal legal system to ameliorate police 
brutality.351 But it is especially problematic if we see prosecution as a form 
of racial justice. As Devon Carbado puts it, when we prosecute an individual 
police officer for visible violence, we continue the myth that “police killings 
of African Americans [are] aberrant and extraordinary, failing to see their 
connections to the routine, to the everyday, and to the ordinary.”352 
The routine, the everyday, and the ordinary looks something like this: 
The Bureau of Justice Statistics lists more than 700,000 reported instances 
of threatened or actual non-fatal force by police between 2002 and 2011, 
including shouts, curses, threatened force, pushing or grabbing, hitting or 
kicking, using pepper spray, using an electroshock weapon, pointing a gun, 
or using other force.353 This is on top of the thousands of fatal interactions 
citizens have with the police.354 Thus, it is no exaggeration to state that, over 
time, millions of people have experienced perfectly legal and sanctioned 
violence by the police. 
We ignore this legal and accepted violence at our peril. Scholars have 
shown that negative interactions with the police lead to vast societal harm.355 
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It is facile, if not dangerous, to pin our hopes for reforming the institution 
of policing by focusing on singular, high salience instances of violence. And 
we ignore the most hopeful solution, envisioning a world that does not rely 
on cages and violence to solve social problems, when we re-inscribe the 
problems of the criminal legal system by relying on it to solve or even to 
aid in police reform. 
The crisis of police violence cannot be reduced to fatal violence, nor to 
criminal violence. Police violence is an everyday experience of brutality and 
degradation, falling mostly on the bodies of poor people of color. Years of 
scholarship, law reform, and investment in “better” policing has failed to 
even chip away at this reality. Similarly, focusing on high salience events 
and relying on the criminal legal system to do any work to stop the violence 
is at best an exercise in naivety and, at worst, serves as an obstacle to the 
needed structural reform. If, as Carbado suggests, police killings are 
intimately bound up with ordinary police activity and violence,356 it 
becomes even clearer that we must turn our attention toward ways to reduce 
our reliance on the police. 
C. Reducing Our Reliance on the Police 
Our reliance on the police is easily comparable to an addiction. Police 
make upwards of ten million arrests per year.357 They conduct over eight 
million searches of pedestrians and motorists.358 On one day in 2020, the 
commissioner of the NYPD touted that his force had responded to 29,000 
calls to 911.359 This Article has endeavored to show that we cannot 
prosecute our way out of police violence. This Section will briefly sketch 
some of the new calls for reducing our reliance on the police and gesture to 
some of the grassroots organizations and scholars who have already turned 
their attention to alternatives to policing.360 
Perhaps the one silver lining that has come out of the brutal killing of 
George Floyd is that the voices of activists and academics who advocate for 
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and envision a world with a radically reduced police presence have been 
amplified.361 Minneapolis listened to those voices when it decided to 
remove police from schools, and other jurisdictions followed suit.362 Many 
cities have already begun referring mental health calls to centers specifically 
designed to handle such crises, rather than to the police.363 Defunding the 
police has gone from a conversation among a few activists and scholars to 
a widely known and legitimate policy proposal.364 Whether these important 
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systemic changes actually are made is more dubious given white America’s 
attention span to the harms of policing.365 But, if and when the public is 
ready, grassroots organizations have been working on how to manage public 
safety without brutality for years. We can see this in small-scale 
organizations throughout the country. 
There are numerous small-scale organizations that are working to find a 
cure for our addiction to police.366 Until recently, they have been doing this 
work with almost no recognition from the larger police reform community, 
let alone policymakers and the public. Yet each of the following examples 
represents a model that can and should be scaled up to address public safety 
issues that are currently squarely in the hands of the police.  
In New York, Critical Resistance NYC works on “fighting policing in 
working class communities of color, to community education projects, to 
grassroots campaigns to oppose prison and jail construction.”367 In Chicago, 
Chain Reaction supports conversations in communities about “alternatives 
to calling the police on young people” to encourage citizens to find other 
ways of resolving problems with children.368 Cure Violence identifies 
violence as a health crisis and addresses it by: (1) detecting and interrupting 
potentially violent conflicts; (2) identifying and treating the highest risk to 
individuals, including changing behaviors and educating about the 
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consequences and use of violence; and (3) mobilizing the community to 
change social norms.369 The White Bird Clinic runs Crisis Assistance 
Helping Out on the Streets (CAHOOTS): a 24/7 “mobile-crisis-intervention 
service” in Eugene, Oregon that is dispatched by the police-fire-ambulance 
communications center. Each team consists of a medic and mental health 
crisis worker.370 
Scaling these organizations requires investment and commitment from 
the public. Given the public’s fickle attention to policing issues, it is 
unlikely they will gain traction without backing from organizations that 
already have major infrastructure. One way to ensure validation and 
amplification for these missions is recognition by the powerful civil rights 
organizations that have the outreach and infrastructure to create change on 
a large scale. Currently, organizations like the ACLU and NAACP seem 
more focused on using our current, deeply problematic criminal legal 
system to sort out policing problems after they have become tragically 
visible. But these organizations could turn their attention and vast media 
platforms to advocating for alternatives to policing.  
There are, of course, legitimate concerns about how well these ideas can 
be scaled. But there are louder, less legitimate concerns that reducing our 
reliance on the police will threaten safety and security. Indeed, it is this 
Article’s contention that falling back on the cycle of fear and violence that 
the criminal legal system relies on for its existence is exactly what hampers 
these new, more hopeful, and potentially more helpful reimaginings from 
receiving the attention they deserve. 
CONCLUSION 
The dominance of our criminal legal system, despite the overwhelming 
evidence of its disfunction is, at base, a political problem.371 Law 
enforcement and their supporters in government, media, and scholarship 
have had a vice grip on messaging and politics for decades. Recent 
scholarship and advocacy has, however, begun to sound a new note. In 
particular, scholars who focus on prison abolition or mass decarceration are 
focused not only on the harms of our prison-backed criminal legal system, 
but also the potential alternatives that exist through reinvestment in 
alternative forms of safety and accountability. 
Yet, many of those who dedicate themselves to reducing the criminal 
legal system continue to rely on it to solve the crisis of police brutality. Until 
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now, there has been no sustained work to explain why this way of thinking 
is an obstacle to the mass decarceration desired by many. This Article has 
endeavored to show why prison abolitionist scholars and decarceration 
advocates must reckon with the use of the criminal legal system against 
police officers if they are to realize their goals. 
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